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Men’s Reproductive Rights:  





 This Article offers the first legal history of men’s procreative 
rights, filling a gap in scholarship on assisted reproduction, consti-
tutional law, and social movements.  A rich literature addresses 
women’s procreative rights in contexts from abortion to infertility.  
By comparison, we know relatively little about the history of the de-
bate about reproductive rights for men.  This void is particularly 
troubling at a time when the law of reproductive rights is increas-
ingly up for grabs, especially in the context of assisted reproduction 
technologies (ART). 
Men’s rights advocates—and the abortion-rights supporters re-
sponding to them—championed a jurisprudential approach to par-
enting that casts a long shadow today.  Men’s rights advocates in-
sisted that procreative rights should depend largely on the 
individual’s reasons for wanting (or not wanting) children rather 
than on sex, biology, or gestation.  Abortion-rights supporters 
largely countered these arguments by pointing to the emotional 
challenges, physical discomfort, and medical risk associated with 
pregnancy—an experience that men could not share.  To resolve this 
conflict, the Court struck a compromise.  In cases where gestation 
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is not a tiebreaker, judges focus on individuals’ reasons for seeking 
or avoiding parenting.  This compromise still influences the law of 
ART and abortion. 
This history helps to make sense of the dual system of reproduc-
tive rights that has emerged in recent years.  While the courts adju-
dicate cases on abortion and assisted reproduction, these bodies of 
law seem to operate largely independently from one another.  This 
Article offers a radically different picture of the relationship be-
tween these bodies of law, showing that they have been inextricably 
linked. 
This Article further exposes the dark side of individualized ap-
proaches to reproductive rights like the ones taken by courts in ART 
cases.  While these approaches promise to move beyond generaliza-
tions about gender, abortion foes championed such a strategy ex-
plicitly because it reinforced gender- and class-based assumptions 
about what counted as a good or bad reason for seeking or avoiding 
parenthood.  In the abortion context, the Court should clarify the 
variables (and their relative weight) relevant to balancing.  In the 
ART context, states should introduce legislation to encourage par-
ties to contract meaningfully about reproduction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers the first legal history of men’s procreative rights, fill-
ing a gap in scholarship on assisted reproduction, constitutional law, and so-
cial movements.1  A rich literature addresses women’s procreative rights in 
contexts ranging from abortion to infertility.2  By comparison, there is rela-
tively little scholarship about the history of the debate surrounding reproduc-
tive rights for men.3  This void is particularly troubling at a time when the law 
of reproductive rights is increasingly up for grabs.4  With the spread of assisted 
reproduction technologies (ART), courts and legislatures have begun to re-
think when men and women have rights to seek and avoid parenthood.5 
 
 1. See Sallie Han, Making Room for Daddy: Men’s “Belly Talk” in the Contemporary United 
States, in RECONCEIVING THE SECOND SEX: MEN, MASCULINITY, AND REPRODUCTION 306 (Marcia 
C. Inhorn et al. eds., 2009) (“Until recently, there has been no place for men in reproduction—not in 
the literature on this topic, as scholars note . . . .”); infra Parts II–IV. 
 2. See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1998); CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA (2017); JOHANNA SCHOEN, ABORTION AFTER ROE (2015); MARY 
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015); Linda Greenhouse & 
Reva B. Siegel, Before (And After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 
(2011). 
 3. For a brief discussion on men’s reproduction rights in the men’s rights movement, see NANCY 
LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 168–70 (1998).  See also Preston D. 
Mitchum, Male Reproductive Autonomy: Unplanned Fatherhood and the Victory of Child Support, 7 
MOD. AM. 10 (2011) (discussing male reproductive autonomy under the Constitution); Lisa Lucile 
Owens, Coerced Parenthood as Family Policy: Feminism, the Moral Agency of Women, and Men’s 
“Right to Choose”, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that unequal treatment of men and 
women’s right to reproductive choices led to a “subjugation-through-rights-guarantees” phenomenon 
for women); Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition 
of Men’s Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U.  L. REV. 141 (1994) (discussing reproductive rights men 
may be entitled to under the Constitution).  Historians and sociologists have offered more perspectives 
on the movement for men’s rights after divorce.  See, e.g., JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT 
DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA (2008); MICHAEL KIMMEL, ANGRY WHITE MEN: 
AMERICAN MASCULINITY AT THE END OF AN ERA 135–68 (2013); MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POLITICS 
OF MASCULINITIES: MEN IN MOVEMENTS 44–45 (1997); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The 
Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016). 
 4. Scholars have noted the various approaches courts have used to determine reproductive rights 
with the spread of assisted reproductive technologies (ART).  See Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduc-
tion Reconceived, 101 MINN. L. REV. 617, 624 (2016) (“States vary significantly with respect to who 
constitutes a donor or a father when individuals or couples use known or anonymous donors to con-
ceive children through alternative reproductive means.”); infra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 5. See Steve P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law: How 
Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 329 
(2015) (discussing questions that ART has left open and stating, the “law has changed far behind this 
groundbreaking technology in the United States”); see also Cahill, supra note 4, 625–38 (examining 
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This Article recovers an important chapter of this missing history.6  Start-
ing in the 1970s, abortion foes tried to join a broader father’s rights move-
ment.7  In the next several decades, the movement for men’s reproductive 
rights won and lost allies, including feminists and members of the broader 
men’s rights movement.8  After experimenting with several alternatives, 
men’s rights advocates insisted that procreative rights should depend largely 
on the individual’s reasons for wanting (or not wanting) children rather than 
on sex, biology, or gestation.9  Abortion-rights supporters largely countered 
these arguments by pointing to the emotional difficulty, physical discomfort, 
and risk associated with pregnancy—an experience that men cannot share.10  
To resolve this conflict, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a compromise: In 
cases where gestation is not a tiebreaker, the legacy of the men’s rights debate 
was clear. 11  In those situations, judges should focus on individuals’ reasons 
for seeking or avoiding parenting, just as men’s rights proponents requested.12 
This history helps to make sense of the dual system of reproductive rights 
that has emerged in recent years.13  While the courts adjudicate cases on abor-
tion and assisted reproduction, these bodies of law seem to operate largely 
independently from one another.14  In the abortion context, men functionally 
have no constitutional say.15  In the ART context, men and women stand on 
relatively equal footing, and most courts resolve disputes by balancing the 
 
the “reproductive binary” between women and men that drives state paternity determinations of sexual 
inseminators); Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 151–56 (2017); Douglas 
NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2285–316 (2017). 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Section II.B. 
 8. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 9. See infra pp. 149–54. 
 10. See infra pp. 154–56. 
 11. See infra pp. 126, 154. 
 12. See infra pp. 126, 154. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See, e.g., Jean Strout, Dads and Dicta: The Values of Acknowledging Fathers’ Interests, 21 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 135, 139 (2014) (stating that the Supreme Court has emphasized that due 
to the physical burden of gestation, abortion decisions are typically framed in terms of women’s 
choice, and “[b]ecause men do not gestate, and thus bear no physical burden, they are excluded from 
constitutional protection”). 
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relative interests of the parties in making their specific reproductive deci-
sion.16  This Article offers a radically different picture of the relationship be-
tween these bodies of law, showing that they have been inextricably linked.17 
The Article further exposes the dark side of individualized approaches to 
reproductive rights like the ones taken by courts in ART cases.18  While these 
approaches seemingly promise to move beyond generalizations about gender, 
abortion foes explicitly championed the strategy because it reinforced gender- 
and class-based assumptions about what counted as a good or bad reason for 
seeking or avoiding parenthood.19  In ART cases, states should do more to 
ensure that couples write their own preferences into enforceable contracts ra-
ther than allowing courts to balance parties’ interests after the fact.20  Even in 
cases where balancing the parties’interests is necessary, the Court should offer 
more clarity on precisely which interests judges should value and how much 
weight each variable deserves.21 
This Article proceeds in four parts.22  Part II explores the emergence of a 
movement for men’s procreative rights in the 1970s and early 1980s, focusing 
on fathers’ claims made in the contexts of abortion, sterilization, and presence 
at the birth of a child.23  As this Part shows, abortion opponents initially 
framed men’s procreative rights as an extension of the right to marry.24  Ac-
tivists explained that giving women unilateral abortion rights increased the 
odds of divorce and undermined the procreative function of marriage.25  But 
by the early 1980s, as abortion opponents borrowed more from the broader 
men’s rights movement that focused on rights after divorce, anti-abortion ac-
tivists adopted different arguments, such as asking for formal equality be-
tween men and women when it came to procreative rights.26  Part III examines 
the transformation of the movement for men’s reproductive rights in the later 
 
 16. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601–04 (Tenn. 1992). 
 17. See infra Section III.B. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Section IV.A. 
 20. See infra Section IV.C. 
 21. See infra Section IV.B. 
 22. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Section II.B. 
 25. See infra Section II.B. 
 26.  See infra Section II.C. 
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1980s, as abortion foes focused on the rights of men regardless of marital sta-
tus or conformity to conventional gender roles.27  These activists urged the 
Court to focus not on the stage of pregnancy or the principle of sex equality, 
but on the individual circumstances of the men and women involved in abor-
tion cases.28  Part IV examines the legacies of this history in contemporary 
abortion and ART jurisprudence, and Part V briefly concludes.29 
II. FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE GESTATION DISTINCTION 
Do men have reproductive rights?30  If so, how far do they reach?31  These 
questions seem largely absent from constitutional jurisprudence.32  It is true 
that the Supreme Court has explored the relative parental rights of men and 
women inside and outside of marriage.33  Its past decisions suggest that the 
Constitution protects a right to procreate,34 and precedents like Griswold v. 
Connecticut,35 Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 and Roe v. Wade37 suggest that the Con-
stitution may also a recognize a right not to procreate.  But many of these 
cases either ignore gender distinctions38 or focus on how reproduction is dif-
ferent for women.39  The reproductive rights of men have received relatively 
little attention.40 
 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
 29. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 30. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 
637, 642–47 (1993) (discussing the traditional difference between the mother-child relationship and 
the father-child relationship). 
 31. Id. at 647–72 (discussing the growth of paternal rights, particularly in cases of unwed fathers). 
 32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 30, at 661. 
 34. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that “[m]arriage 
and procreation” are fundamental rights). 
 35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965). 
 36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 38. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 486 (emphasizing a gender-neutral “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”). 
 39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–41. 
 40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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The legal history of men’s reproductive rights is similarly undeveloped.41  
In recent years, historians have begun examining the fathers’ rights move-
ment—a subject that has received relatively little attention.42  However, even 
these studies focus on the rights of men after childbirth, particularly during 
divorce.43 
This Part begins to develop a history of men’s reproductive rights.44  As 
this Part shows, abortion foes initially tried to benefit from discomfort with 
the decline of traditional marriage, framing abortion as yet one more threat to 
men’s traditional role as fathers and husbands.45  However, individual men 
also went to court to block abortions, sometimes without the support of the 
anti-abortion movement, and many of these men were unmarried, or younger 
or poorer than the idealized father painted by pro-lifers.46  Abortion-rights 
supporters responded partly by suggesting that the law should not reinforce a 
form of traditional marriage that often harmed women.47  Increasingly, how-
ever, as feminists viewed divorce reform with more ambivalence, abortion-
rights supporters insisted that women should always have paramount abortion 
rights because of their unique gestational capacity.48  Next, this Part examines 
 
 41. See Han, supra note 1. 
 42. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 43. See LEVIT, supra note 3, at 169–71 (describing the paramount concerns of the various men’s 
rights groups in the 1990s were fathers’ rights upon dissolution of the marriage). 
 44. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 45. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795–97 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting the father’s fundamen-
tal right to procreate offspring within the marriage relationship, but ultimately invalidating a state law 
requiring the husband’s consent before an abortion); Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abor-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary 
H.R., 94th Cong. 248–49 (1976) [hereinafter Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion] (tes-
timony of J. Jerome Mansmann, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. of Pennsylvania); Abortion Part IV: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 247 (1975) [hereinafter Abortion Part IV] (statement of Dennis Horan, Attorney, Americans 
United for Life and Illinois Right to Life Committee); Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene 
Diamond and Americans United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 
74-1419, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-
1419), 1976 WL 178721, at *104 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae of Diamond and AUL]; Two Enter Ap-
pearance for Husband, DECATUR DAILY REV., Feb. 27, 1974, at 42, https://www.newspa-
pers.com/clip/36604422/the_decatur_daily_review/ (detailing an abortion case where a wife obtained 
an abortion without the husband’s consent). 
 46. See Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974), and Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1973), for examples of these cases. 
 47. See, e.g., Linda Mathews, High Court to Rule on Spouse’s Rights, ANNISTON STAR, Mar. 17, 
1974, at 10E. 
 48. See Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, a Missouri Corporation, David Hall, 
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how the Supreme Court intervened in this conflict.49  In Planned Parenthood 
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Justices struck down a spousal-consent 
law, emphasizing that pregnancy served as a tiebreaker.50  Finally, this Part 
examines how men’s rights activists adapted after Danforth.51  Rather than 
spotlighting the importance of traditional marriage, abortion foes began main-
taining that equality between the sexes required reproductive rights for some 
men.52  Related arguments captured the support of some of those outside of 
the abortion debate, especially when it came to child-support obligations.53  
Abortion-rights supporters again stressed that equal treatment required no 
such thing: men and women were not similarly situated because only women 
could get pregnant.54  This argument continued to make a difference, and by 
the later 1980s, even as abortion rights enjoyed less protection, pro-lifers 
searched for a new way to carve out reproductive rights for men.55 
A. Men’s Reproductive Rights Before Roe 
Before 1965, the Court’s most famous pronouncement on the right to pro-
create came in a case involving a man.56  Skinner v. Oklahoma involved an 
 
M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D., Appellants and Cross-Appellees at 87, Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1975 WL 171451 [hereinafter 
Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri] (“The wife’s claim for protection equal to that 
extended to all other unwillingly pregnant women is based on her personal right to privacy in matters 
relating to the protection of her physical and mental health.”); Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the 
Center for Constitutional Rights and the Women’s Law Project at 7, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419) (“The husband’s own right to procreate does 
not entitle him to use an unwilling spouse's body for that purpose”); Joan Fallon, Man’s Right Per-
taining to Abortion, LOWELL SUN, Jan. 2, 1974, at 2A. 
 49. See infra Section II.B. 
 50. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70–71 (1976) (“Inasmuch as it is 
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by 
the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”). 
 51. See infra Section II.C. 
 52. See, e.g., Joan Beck, Fathers Ask for a Right in Abortion Prevention, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1977, 
at 18; Blair Kamin, Dad’s Lawsuit Comes to End with Abortion, DES MOINES DAILY REG., Mar. 5, 
1985, at 3A. 
 53. See Jack Hovelson, Action Filed; Woman Agrees to Bear Child, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 25, 
1987, at 3A; David M. Margolick, An Unlikely Pair Strikes a Blow for Father’s Rights, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1981, at 7A; Frustrated Men Launch Their Own Liberation Movement, INDEP. REC., 
June 17, 1981, at 3D. 
 54. See infra Section II.B. 
 55. See infra Part III. 
 56. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942). 
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Oklahoma law that required the sterilization of male inmates who had three 
or more criminal convictions, but exempted those who had committed white-
collar crimes.57  The Skinner Court held that the law violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.58  “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of 
the basic civil rights of man,” the Court explained.59  “Marriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”60  Skinner 
notwithstanding, the idea of reproductive rights was novel before the 1960s, 
and even after the Court recognized such rights, the discussion most often 
(and legitimately) centered on the experiences of women.61 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, state law bore the influence 
of the eugenics movement.62  Between 1900 and 1935, more than thirty states 
required the sterilization of people deemed genetically unfit, including people 
who were deemed to have questionable moral character.63  In theory, these 
laws applied evenly to men and women.64  In practice, however, states dispro-
portionately sterilized women.65  In North Carolina, a state with one of the 
nation’s highest sterilization rates, women comprised 85% of those steri-
lized.66  Similarly, women made up the vast majority of those sterilized in 
California in the first part of the twentieth century.67  This disparity was no 
 
 57. Id. at 536–37. 
 58. Id. at 541. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 62. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN 
HEREDITY 92–94 (1985), WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND 
EUGENICS FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 2–3 (2001), STEFAN KÜHL, THE 
NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 44–46 
(1994), and MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2008), for further discussion on the history of the eugenic legal reform 
movement. 
 63. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Eugenic Feminism: Mental Hygiene, the Women’s Movement, and the 
Campaign for Eugenic Legal Reform, 1900–1935, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 211, 212, 215–17 (2008). 
 64. See id. at 216–18. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See, e.g., RANDALL HANSEN & DESMOND KING, STERILIZED BY THE STATE: EUGENICS, RACE, 
AND THE POPULATION SCARE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 242 (2013). 
 67. See Ziegler, supra note 63, at 216.  Similarly, the proportion of state-sterilized women in Cal-
ifornia grew during the length of the program, while the proportion of affected men shrank.  See Joel 
T. Braslow, In the Name of Therapeutics: The Practice of Sterilization in a California State Hospital, 
51 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 29, 45 (1996) (discussing sterilization rates at a single California 
hospital form 1910–1950). 
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surprise: many of the statutory grounds for sterilization reflected discomfort 
with female sexuality outside of marriage.68 
After Skinner, when the Court began recognizing the right to avoid pro-
creation, gender played a minor role.  For example, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, the Court struck down a Connecticut law banning the use of contraception 
by married couples.69  Griswold invalidated the law, reasoning that it violated 
a right to marital privacy.70  “Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,” the 
Court reasoned.71  Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a 
Massachusetts contraception law, clarifying that reproductive rights belonged 
to individuals rather than married couples.72  Neither Eisenstadt nor Griswold 
addressed whether reproductive rights had any relationship to an individual’s 
gender.73 
B. Men’s Rights and the Marriage Bargain 
Roe v. Wade gave the first glimpse of the relationship between gender and 
reproductive rights.74  In its explanation on whether the Constitution protected 
reproductive rights, the Court homed in on the detriment imposed on the 
woman if denied the choice to have an abortion: the “[s]pecific and direct 
harm” tied to gestation, the “[p]sychological harm,” the difficulties of child 
care, and the “stigma of unwed motherhood.”75  In contrast, Roe and its com-
panion case, Doe v. Bolton,76 declined to address whether men had any pro-
creative rights, in the abortion context or otherwise.77  The Court noted that 
none of the parties asserted any rights for men in Roe or Doe, and neither of 
the challenged statutes raised the issue.78  Partly because Roe avoided the 
question of men’s reproductive rights, abortion foes immediately saw fathers’ 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 486. 
 72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972). 
 73. See id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). 
 77. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (stating that neither Roe nor Doe discussed the father’s right in 
the abortion decision). 
 78. See id. 
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rights as a potentially promising path79—perhaps, the Court deliberately men-
tioned men’s rights to flag a willingness to uphold a related law.80 
But the reasons for interest in men’s procreational rights went beyond the 
language of Roe.81  Starting in the 1960s, the fathers’ rights movement 
emerged, which initially challenged welfare laws that treated lovers as “sub-
stitute fathers” and participating in discussions on how to reform divorce 
laws.82  By the early 1970s, when states turned away from fault requirements 
for divorce, the fathers’ rights movement offered advice and new ideas on 
how to change alimony, child custody, and child support laws.83  At the same 
time, child-bearing patterns and preferences began to shift; while a majority 
of Americans once said that a four-child family was ideal, in 1971, most pre-
ferred only a two-child family.84  As some people struggled to adapt to the 
new family preferences, the fathers’ rights movement had particular reso-
nance.85 
Abortion opponents sought to benefit from these trends by bringing cases 
premised on men’s reproductive rights.86  At first, pro-lifers used sympathy 
for men’s rights as an argument for a constitutional amendment that would 
overturn Roe.87  By the mid-1970s, an official, secular anti-abortion move-
ment had been active for over a decade.88  Almost always with the support of 
local Catholic dioceses, anti-abortion organizations had formed the decade 
before to oppose laws repealing or reforming restrictions on abortion.89  These 
 
 79. See infra Section II.C. 
 80. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (stating, “We need not now decide whether provisions [that 
recognize the father’s right in the abortion context] are constitutional.”). 
 81. See Dinner, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing how early fathers’ rights activists in the 1960s 
sought to restore the traditional family structure, and the socioeconomic status men derived from it). 
 82. See id. at 94–97. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See, e.g., George Gao, Americans’ Ideal Family Size Is Smaller than It Used to Be, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 8, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/08/ideal-size-of-the-american-
family/ [http://pewrsr.ch/1RjXPC4]. 
 85. See Totz, supra note 3, at 202 (discussing the impact of the women’s movement on men’s 
parental rights). 
 86. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he state contends that the 
statute is necessary to protect the rights of a husband whose wife desire an abortion.”). 
 87. Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 898–903 (2014) 
(discussing the constitutional amendment campaign). 
 88. See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT BEFORE 
ROE V. WADE 1–2, 6 (2016) (discussing the early years of the anti-abortion movement). 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 39–133. 
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groups primarily presented themselves as champions of the unborn child’s 
right to life.90 
Before Roe, some abortion opponents had suggested that opposition to 
abortion reflected the importance of reproductive rights for men as well as 
women.91  However, supporters of abortion rights argued that laws like 
Texas’s ban in Roe violated the rights of married men, by compromising their 
happiness and ability to plan their families.92  For example, in Roe, those chal-
lenging the law included a married couple who was worried about the effect 
of an unplanned pregnancy on their union.93  That couple emphasized that the 
“spectre of pregnancy [was] having a divisive effect [on their] marriage,” and 
on the marriages of some of the other couples challenging the law.94  For the 
most part, however, those on both sides focused on the privacy rights of 
women and the opposing interest of the government in protecting fetal life.95  
“The right to live is more basic even than the right to procreate,” explained 
Americans United for Life (AUL), a leading anti-abortion group.96 
But after Roe, concerns about the rights of men took on more importance 
for abortion opponents.97  Abortion foes recognized that arguments for fetal 
rights had not convinced the Court or yet established adequate support for a 
constitutional amendment overturning Roe—the pro-life movement’s key in-
itiative after 1973.98  In searching for new arguments against abortion, pro-
lifers tried to rebut arguments that compulsory pregnancies helped to damage 
 
 90. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 87, at 899–904. 
 91. See, e.g., Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 65, 70 (state-
ment of John Noonan, Professor of Law, University of California Law School at Berkeley). 
 92. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Brief for Appellants at 49, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 
128054. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 10–57; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Women’s 
Organizations and Named Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case, and Brief Amici Curiae at 
6–17, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1972 WL 126045; Brief of Americans 
United for Life, Amicus Curiae, In Support of Appellee at 4–11, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128055 [hereinafter Brief of Americans United for Life]; Motion for Permis-
sion to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women’s Health and 
Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition at 8–60, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 134283. 
 96. Brief of Americans United for Life, supra note 95, at 8. 
 97. See Totz, supra note 3, at 191 (discussing how the Supreme Court dealt with fathers’ rights in 
a case subsequent to Roe).  
 98. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 87, at 899–904. 
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nuclear families and undermine traditional marriages.99  As the divorce rate 
continued to climb in the 1970s, worries about the traditional family grew 
widespread.100  “By 1974, forty-five states had legislated no-fault divorce.”101  
Changes to divorce laws came at a time when many families were down-
wardly mobile and hurt by layoffs, inflation, and a painful recession.102 
Legal and economic changes convinced commentators that the family 
was under fire, and abortion opponents framed the denial of men’s procreative 
rights as a threat to the traditional family.103  Dennis Horan, a nationally prom-
inent pro-life attorney who assumed AUL leadership after Roe v. Wade, 
stressed that the Court’s decision in that case “provided one more wedge to 
separate, undermine and ultimately destroy the nuclear family.”104  Divorce 
and abortion law had encouraged people to think of families as made up of 
individuals rather than members of a unit, putting the family at risk.105  Abor-
tion opponents complained that men had “been reduced to onlooker[s].”106  
Abortion opponent Carol Mansmann similarly concluded that men had lost 
reproductive rights, and the family had become a collection of “fully autono-
mous individuals who [had] no binding relationship with each other.”107 
In this account, men’s reproductive rights sprang from and reinforced the 
traditional family.108  In the traditional family, by entering into marriage, men 
gained the right to procreate with their wives and surrendered the right to pro-
create with anyone else.109  Marriage, by extension, required joint decision-
 
 99. Cf. Brief for Appellants, supra note 93, at 49 (exemplifying an argument that an abortion stat-
ute is having an adverse impact on a traditional marriage). 
 100. See, e.g., ANDREW CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 45–53 (2009). 
 101. Dinner, supra note 3, at 103. 
 102. See, e.g., THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE 1970S: A NEW GLOBAL HISTORY FROM CIVIL RIGHTS 
TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 122 (2012). 
 103. See, e.g., Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 258 (“Certainly no [one] could have anticipated 
that Roe v. Wade would have such an undermining effect on relationship of parents and their children, 
or one spouse to the other.”). 
 104. Id.; see also History, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, https://aul.org/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 30, 
2019). 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 239 (statement of Prof. 
Carol Mansmann, School of Law, Duquesne University). 
 108. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 [Vol. 47: 665, 2020] Men’s Reproductive Rights 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
679 
making about procreation.110  By allowing women alone to make abortion de-
cisions, Roe deprived men of procreative autonomy inherent in the marriage 
and intensified marital discord.111  Abortion opponent John Noonan argued: 
“The proponents of abortion have . . . been led to challenge the structure of 
the family itself . . . .  The person seeking an abortion has become by federal 
fiat an anonymous, rootless individual without spouse, parents, or family.”112 
By appealing to tradition and history, abortion opponents also tied men’s 
rights to their traditional roles as providers and sole decision makers in the 
family.113  Joseph Witherspoon, a law professor and leading member of Na-
tional Right to Life Committee (NRLC), argued that men had the responsibil-
ity of “bring[ing] the protection of marriage . . . to his family.”114  He argued 
that the Thirteenth Amendment, a provision abolishing slavery, created the 
foundation for men’s procreative rights.115  “It seems clear that there is a 
strong foundation in the Thirteenth Amendment for sustaining the right of a 
husband or a father of an unborn child to prevent the child’s mother from 
securing an abortion,” Witherspoon testified before Congress.116  “One of the 
most important purposes its framers had in mind was to bring protection to 
the family relationship of those who had been or might become slaves and to 
the personal rights of each member of the family.”117 
Those rights, in turn, reflected men’s interest in assuming the traditional 
masculine role.118  Men had rights to father children, “claim” them, and protect 
and provide for them.119  Abortion denied men the right to procreate and as-
sume their traditional role in marriage.120  “It seems perfectly clear,” With-
 
 110. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 112. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 70 (statement of John T. 
Noonan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California Law School at Berkeley). 
 113. See id. at 24–25 (statement of Joseph Witherspoon, Professor, University of Texas Law 
School) (discussing how one of the purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment was to protect the integrity 
of the family for those who had been slaves). 
 114. Id. at 25. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 531 (prepared testimony of Joseph P. Witherspoon, Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Texas School of Law). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 560 (testifying that the Constitution protects a paramount civil right in the father both to 
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erspoon argued, “that to subject the father of an unborn child to the uncon-
trolled discretion of its mother with respect to having an abortion is to convert 
that father into a partial slave.”121 
Abortion opponents introduced restrictions designed to protect men’s 
procreative rights in marriage.122  Under Dennis Horan’s leadership, AUL at-
torneys helped draft laws to prevent abortions and defended such laws in 
court. 123  Horan and his attorney wife, Dolores, spearheaded one such defense 
in a case involving a Florida law that required a woman to have her husband’s 
consent in order to obtain an abortion.124  In August 1973, the district court 
overturned the law, but it appeared to suggest it would be open to a revised 
version of the spousal-consent law.125  The court suggested that the govern-
ment might have a compelling interest in protecting men’s reproductive 
rights.126  “The biological bifurcation of the sexes, which dictates that the fe-
male alone carry the procreation of the two sexes, should not necessarily fore-
close the active participation of the male in decisions relating to whether their 
mutual procreation should be aborted or allowed to prosper,” the court ex-
plained.127  “The interest which a husband has in seeing his procreation carried 
full term is, perhaps, at least equal to that of the mother.”128  The problem with 
the law in that case was that it did not specify why men could withhold their 
consent, the district court reasoned.129  And although it held that the law was 
unconstitutional, the district court refused to enjoin it.130  The Horans hoped 
that the Supreme Court would hear the Florida case, and that similar efforts to 
secure reproductive rights for men would spread.131 
 
conceive and raise his own child and to protect it against all who would destroy or hurt it”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 698 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (discussing a Florida 
regulation that required written parental consent, written spousal consent, or both before getting an 
abortion). 
 123. See History, supra note 104. 
 124. See Two Enter Appearance, supra note 45. 
 125. See Coe, 376 F. Supp. at 696–97. 
 126. See id. at 697–98. 
 127. Id. at 698. 
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 130. See id. at 699. 
 131. Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 248 (discussing the Horans’ anti-abortion advocacy and 
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While pro-life attorneys looked for test cases involving respectable, mid-
dle-class married couples, other men tried to establish what they saw as their 
own reproductive rights by other means.132  In Florida, with no law backing 
his claim, an unmarried man tried to stop his ex-girlfriend of six months from 
terminating her pregnancy, arguing that her abortion decision violated an im-
plicit agreement the two made by having unprotected sex.133  Similarly, in 
Massachusetts, a state that did not have spousal-involvement legislation at the 
time, John Doe, a twenty-seven-year old truck driver who sought to stop his 
estranged wife from ending her pregnancy, took his case all the way to the 
state’s highest court.134  No group backed John Doe’s case, but the Massachu-
setts affiliate of the National Organization for Women (NOW), a national 
women’s liberation group, supported Doe’s wife.135 
According to Susan Dunderson of NOW, the women’s gestational capac-
ity should be the deciding factor in such cases.136  “It is a woman’s body, and 
if she does not find a pregnancy tolerable, she should not be made to continue 
it,” Dunderson explained.137  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided 
with Jane Doe.138  While recognizing that Roe had left the issue of the hus-
band’s rights open, the court reasoned that marital privacy militated against 
the court ordering a woman not to end her pregnancy, at least before fetal 
viability.139  Two judges dissented, suggesting that the Constitution and com-
mon law may recognize procreative rights for men.140 
How should the courts balance competing reproductive rights of men and 
women in cases where gestation was not the tiebreaker?141  One of the dissent-
ing judges in Doe proposed a strategy that would take on importance decades 
 
 132. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (“The primary question 
presented is whether a potential putative father has the right to restrain the natural mother form termi-
nating a pregnancy resulting from their cohabitation.”); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974) 
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 133. See Jones, 278 So. 2d at 340, 342–43. 
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 135. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 48. 
 136. See id. 
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 138. See Doe, 314 N.E.2d at 132–33. 
 139. See id. at 132. 
 140. Id. at 133–39 (Hennessey, J., dissenting; Reardon, J., dissenting). 
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later: judges should look at the individual circumstances of the parties in the 
case.142  The judge noted that John Doe had offered to assume the responsibil-
ity and care of the child after birth, and to defray the medical costs of the 
delivery and pregnancy.143  Whereas Jane Doe’s interests, the judge reasoned, 
were temporary—avoiding the physical discomforts and health risks of preg-
nancy—John Doe stood to permanently lose his child.144 
Still, in the aftermath of Doe v. Doe, abortion opponents mostly tried to 
highlight anxiety about the transformation of traditional marriage.145  
Women’s rights activists responded partly that if women were forced to seek 
abortions without their husbands’ permission, a marriage might not be worth 
saving.146  “[T]hat’s not an intact marriage,” said Jan Liebman of NOW about 
unions where the parties disagreed about reproduction.147  “That’s a war.”148  
Women’s rights groups continued to emphasize that a woman’s gestational 
capacity should decide the question of who had procreative rights.149  “The 
woman is the one who carries the fetus[] and gives birth to it, so she should 
be the only one who decides to carry it to term,” explained Liebman.150 
Nevertheless, arguments focused on the husband’s prerogatives took cen-
ter stage when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a multi-re-
striction Missouri abortion statute.151  The law required doctors to have a hus-
band’s written consent unless the woman’s life was at risk.152  Missouri 
Attorney General John Danforth justified the law as an attempt to preserve 
traditional marriage.153  He reasoned that to safeguard marriage, the state 
 
and discussing the complexity of balancing competing reproductive rights where gestation does not 
pose a health risk to the mother). 
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(2014). 
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 151. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68–72 (1976). 
 152. See id. at 58. 
 153. See Brief of John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri at 34–41, Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 1787280, at *21. 
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could proscribe “activities which are deleterious to marriage.”154  Guided by 
its belief that marriage was an institution requiring joint decisions, Missouri 
required both spouses to agree about decisions about everything from adop-
tion and sterilization to the disposition of property.155  Allowing women to 
make unilateral decisions about abortion, Missouri argued, put marriages at 
risk.156 
AUL filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Missouri’s law and simi-
larly argued for government protection of traditional marriages, centered on 
procreation.157  It urged that at a time when divorce was increasingly common, 
the government should seek “to protect and strengthen family life.”158  As 
AUL saw it, the fact that divorce had become readily accessible did not change 
the government’s interest in maximizing the chances that traditional marriage 
would survive.159 
AUL described marriage partly as a companionate union designed for the 
parties’ happiness: “The relational integrity of marriage is protected by the 
mutual knowledge, consent and consultation of the parties in the important 
matter of child-bearing and procreation.”160  However, AUL also stressed that 
traditionally, men entered into marriage to procreate, and could see “the pur-
pose[] and meaning of the marital relation” destroyed if a woman terminated 
her pregnancy.161 
AUL appealed to the Court’s interest in maintaining a traditional, procre-
ation-centered vision of marriage, but the group also suggested that men’s 
procreative rights made sense in the context of more egalitarian relation-
ships.162  AUL started with the position that the Constitution protected men’s 
as well as women’s rights to procreate.163  “The affirmative right of the male, 
‘married or unmarried’, to decide to beget and raise children is hollow indeed 
if the state may not, in some circumstance, act to secure his interests,” AUL 
 
 154. Id. at 15. 
 155. See id. at 35–37. 
 156. See id. at 38. 
 157. See Amicus Curiae of Diamond and AUL, supra note 45, at 98–101. 
 158. Id. at 99. 
 159. See id. at 98–100. 
 160. Id. at 101. 
 161. Id. at 100. 
 162. See id. at 103–13. 
 163. See id. at 102. 
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argued.164  But men’s reproductive rights did not simply arise from the tradi-
tion and history surrounding the traditional family.165  Fathers’ roles had 
changed, as AUL saw it, and as a result, formally equal treatment required 
recognizing abortion rights for men: 
Either or both marriage partners may suffer the legal, economic, so-
cial or psychological “detriments” which, as this Court has observed, 
may result from pregnancy and subsequent parenthood; either or both 
may suffer social, economic, legal or psychological detriments as the 
result of an abortion.  Legally enforceable duties are incurred by the 
husband if the child is brought to term; legally enforceable duties may 
be incurred if the wife chooses to abort—for example, economic lia-
bility for the medical procedure and whatever complications which 
result in the woman or subsequent children of the marriage.  Here, 
the joint interests and responsibilities of the parties to marriage create 
obligations and liabilities in the husband.  Yet, if he is denied a joint 
interest in the disposition of unborn children to his marriage, he is 
burdened with all the liabilities and none of the prerogatives of deci-
sions to bring children to term or not.166 
Men, as AUL put it, shared emotional bonds with their unborn children.167  
Equally important, AUL suggested, men shared the financial responsibility 
for raising children regardless of whether a marriage lasted.168  And as men 
took on more child-care responsibilities, some men would share the day-to-
day burden of child-rearing.169  For these married men, as AUL saw it, preg-
nancy, childbirth, and child-rearing created burdens similar to those experi-
enced by their wives, and equal treatment required the recognition of repro-
ductive rights for both men and women.170 
Planned Parenthood’s supporters responded that the government could 
not and should not save a form of traditional marriage that often oppressed 
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women.171  For example, in its amicus curiae brief, the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights stressed that “the assertion of state power to guarantee the hus-
band’s control must be viewed as insufficient, irrational and, indeed, as a rep-
rehensible and impermissible extension of the common law subjugation of the 
married woman to her husband’s will.”172  Other amicus curiae briefs insisted 
that because of the woman’s role in gestating a pregnancy, any rights enjoyed 
by men had to come second to a woman’s abortion decision.173  “A spouse has 
no right to father children by any particular woman,” Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri reasoned.174 
The Supreme Court handed down a decision in Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth in 1976, encouraging abortion opponents and 
their allies to find a different way to define reproductive rights for men.175  The 
Court held that Missouri could not delegate to a spouse veto power that the 
state itself did not possess, at least during the first trimester of pregnancy.176 
Danforth recognized that a woman’s abortion decision could jeopardize 
her marriage.177  Nevertheless, as Danforth reasoned, it was “difficult to be-
lieve that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of 
strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be 
achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason what-
soever or for no reason at all.”178  When men and women disagreed, moreover, 
the Court adopted the abortion-rights supporters’ position that gestation 
should be the tiebreaker.179  “Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically 
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the 
pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor,” Danforth 
concluded.180 
Danforth did not diminish abortion opponents’ interests in men’s repro-
 
 171. See infra notes 172, 174 and accompanying text. 
 172. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Women’s Law 
Project, supra note 48, at 19. 
 173. See Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, supra note 48, at 15. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 68–71 (1976). 
 176. Id. at 69. 
 177. See id. at 70. 
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 179. See id. at 70–71. 
 180. Id. at 71. 
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ductive rights.  Men continued seeking to stop women from ending their preg-
nancies, with many of them seeking to differentiate their cases from 
Danforth.181  Increasingly, many of these men fit a profile: men who were 
young, white, relatively low-income, unmarried, and uneducated, who 
claimed that their girlfriends would have married and relied on them for child-
rearing and financial support but for the interference of the woman’s par-
ents.182  “She has a lot to lose—a family to lose, a college education.  She has 
just me to gain,” explained one litigant.183 
These men asserted that the Court had not fully resolved the issue of 
men’s rights in Danforth.184  Some, like twenty-four-year-old James Priebe, 
argued that Danforth applied only to abortions early in pregnancy; according 
to Priebe, men had fundamental reproductive rights as a pregnancy pro-
gressed.185  Some of these men tried to organize; for example, in Illinois, fifty 
men formed the group Fathers United Against Abortion, which brought to-
gether men who had unsuccessfully tried to stop an abortion.186  While invest-
ment in men’s rights did not diminish, the outcome of these cases seemed 
similar: Danforth notwithstanding, men often succeeded in convincing trial 
judges to issue restraining orders, but women often terminated their pregnan-
cies notwithstanding any order.187 
By the early 1980s, however, the arguments for men’s reproductive rights 
had shifted: rather than framing men’s rights as an extension of the right to 
marry, pro-life activists and their allies emphasized the importance of for-
mally equal treatment for men’s and women’s reproduction.  The next Section 
turns to this debate.188 
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C. Child Support, Procreation, and Formal Equality 
In the early 1980s, as a nationwide recession deepened, the politics of 
men’s reproductive rights again got caught up in changes to the traditional 
conception of family and to family law.  Divorce rates peaked at 5.3 divorces 
per 1,000 people in 1981,189 and marriage rates began a steady decline.190  As 
more children lived with only one parent, federal and state lawmakers stepped 
up efforts to collect delinquent child support payments.191  Starting in the early 
1980s, states and cities began developing more effective techniques for col-
lecting child support, such as the garnishment of child support payments from 
a man’s paycheck or federal income tax returns.192  Pressure for similar laws 
seemed likely as the number of single mothers grew, especially in major urban 
areas: In New York City, authorities reported that more than one in three chil-
dren would be born to a single mother; nationally, the rate was one in six—
more than doubling over the course of the previous decade.193 
Changing custody arrangements shaped the debate about men’s reproduc-
tive rights.  In 1980, California became the first state to adopt a law allowing 
for joint legal and physical custody, and other states soon followed suit.194  
Legal changes suggested that after childbirth, men might have more child-
rearing responsibilities than had once been the case, convincing some that 
men should have more control over childrearing responsibilities in the first 
place.195 
Cultural attitudes about fatherhood reinforced demands for new reproduc-
tive rights for men.  In the early 1980s, images of fatherhood in the media 
changed; sociologists and advertisers highlighted the “new father,” a man who 
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was present at the delivery of his children and more hands-on after birth.196  
While more modest, there were also changes to the amount of childcare men 
performed.197 
As more men assumed childcare responsibilities, or could imagine doing 
so, proponents of men’s reproductive rights described their demands in dif-
ferent terms.  First, it made less sense to connect men’s reproductive rights to 
traditional marriage when men were less likely to be or remain married.  As 
important, men’s rights activists increasingly took issue with what they saw 
as the disconnect between reproductive rights and responsibilities.198  Some 
men’s rights activists argued that if men had to support their children finan-
cially, they should have more control over when and how they had children.199  
Others asserted that men who were willing to assume sole caretaking respon-
sibility for a child should have the exclusive decision-making authority over 
the child’s birth.200 
Debate about child support and abortion increased the attention on repro-
ductive rights within the fathers’ rights movement.  Men’s rights activists had 
long focused on the reform of divorce laws, but by the early 1980s, groups 
like Men’s Equality Now International (MEN International) and the National 
Congress for Men (NCM) spoke out on behalf of men seeking to block abor-
tion.201  Formed in 1977, MEN International primarily lobbied against what 
members saw as discrimination against men after divorce.202  Founded in the 
early 1980s, NCM appealed to members of local and state father’s rights 
groups looking for a cohesive national organization.203 
Groups like NCM initially prioritized changes to divorce laws, but began 
seeing men’s reproductive rights as a related issue.204  The Men’s Rights As-
sociation, a forerunner of MEN International, explained, “Without taking an 
official position for or against abortion per se, we maintain that the father, 
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married or unmarried, has an equal right to determine the fate of his offspring, 
born or unborn, Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding.”205  NCM 
took a similar stand at its 1981 Houston national conference.206  NCM con-
tended that abortion rights “trample[d] on the legitimate rights of the father-
to-be.”207 
As the fathers’ rights movement embraced men’s abortion rights, abortion 
foes borrowed from increasingly visible fathers’ rights claims based on formal 
equality between the sexes.208  As Deborah Dinner has shown, men’s rights 
activists initially resisted child support obligations as an attack on traditional 
marriage.209  But over the course of the 1980s, these advocates framed their 
arguments differently, demanding sex-neutral, equal rules governing child 
support and child custody—and insisting that men who had financial respon-
sibility for their children should also have some right to custody and care of 
those children.210 
In the context of men’s reproductive rights, similar arguments spread in 
the early 1980s in the abortion and child support contexts.  One example, 
which AUL was involved in, was Scheinberg v. Smith, a case involving a 
Florida spousal-notification law.211  The district court had struck it down, but 
the Fifth Circuit reversed, emphasizing the state’s interest in protecting the 
integrity and procreative potential of marriage.212  The Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that because notification involved a less onerous burden on women’s repro-
ductive rights, the law was constitutional.213  AUL lawyers took hope from 
Scheinberg that the courts might uphold spousal-notification laws.214 
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Often, however, men demanded rights without any statute supporting 
their cause, framing their cause as an extension of formally equal treatment 
for men and women.  James E. Koerber, a twenty-three-year-old man from 
Tennessee, insisted that sex equality required abortion rights for men.215  “I 
will nurture, take care of and protect my child,” Koerber explained, in his suit 
to stop his former lover’s abortion.216  Koerber emphasized that he deserved 
reproductive rights because of his willingness to assume care of his child.217 
In Iowa, men also made sex-equality arguments.  In one case, a fathers’ 
rights group backed a Boonesville man who had proposed to his girlfriend 
after she learned she was pregnant.218  The man emphasized that because men 
had responsibilities both before and after childbirth, it was discriminatory to 
deny men say over an abortion.219  A few years later, the Iowa Fathers’ Rights 
Council bankrolled a similar suit.220  In both cases, the men tried to distinguish 
their suits from Danforth, insisting that the Court had settled disputes only 
between women and the state, and not between two private parties.221  But 
these men often highlighted what they described as equality between the 
sexes—arguing that men’s willingness to assume responsibilities or child-
support obligations required the recognition of equal reproductive rights.222 
In the 1980s, similar arguments for men’s reproductive rights emerged 
when men sought to avoid child support obligations.223  Perhaps the most 
prominent of these cases involved Frank Serpico, a former New York Police 
Department officer who was known for blowing the whistle on corruption in 
the department.224  In the early 1980s, a flight attendant known only as “L. 
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Pamela P.” established that Serpico was the father of her child and sued him 
for child support.225 
Serpico claimed that he had unprotected sex with L. Pamela P. only be-
cause she told him that she was taking birth control pills and could not get 
pregnant.226  Strikingly, Serpico’s attorney, Karen DeCrow, was a feminist 
who had formerly served as the president of NOW.227  DeCrow insisted that 
sex equality required some form of reproductive rights for men.228  In her 
view, the right to avoid parenthood applied equally to both men and women.229  
“Just as the Supreme Court . . . said [in 1973] that women have the right to 
choose whether or not to be parents, men should all have that right,” DeCrow 
told the media.230 
In court, men like Serpico made both state law and constitutional argu-
ments.231  For example, Serpico maintained that under New York law, men 
and women had equal financial responsibility for a child because they had an 
equal say in creating the child.232  In his view, a woman who unilaterally de-
cided to have a child should have sole financial responsibility for it.233 
DeCrow also made constitutional arguments on Serpico’s behalf.  She 
maintained that judicial enforcement of a child support action counted as state 
action for the purpose of Serpico’s argument.234  And she asserted that because 
reproductive rights belonged equally to men and women, L. Pamela P. had 
tried to deny Serpico’s right by lying to him about the possibility of conceiv-
ing.235 
These arguments worked in the trial court, but the New York appellate 
court responded that Serpico could not have constitutional interests because 
he did not seek to vindicate his right to avoid procreation, but instead asked 
to “have his choice regarding procreation fully respected by other individuals 
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and effectuated to the extent that he should be relieved of his obligation to 
support a child that he did not voluntarily choose to have.”236  Notwithstanding 
the outcome of L. Pamela P., men continued to make similar arguments about 
reproductive rights.237  Almost uniformly, state courts rejected these argu-
ments, reasoning that any rights men may have did not exempt them from 
child support obligations.238 
L. Pamela P. and other child-support cases suggested that the politics of 
men’s reproductive rights could be complex.  Outside of the abortion context, 
DeCrow, a feminist, thought that awarding men reproductive rights would in-
crease the odds of men taking on more responsibility for their children and the 
home.  But, as Part III contends, men’s reproductive rights increasingly be-
came identified with the abortion battle.239 
III. THE BALANCING COMPROMISE 
In the later 1980s, men’s reproductive rights became a central issue in the 
law and politics of both abortion and assisted reproduction.  This Part begins 
by examining the reinvigorated campaign for men’s abortion rights in the late 
1980s.240  This campaign emerged partly because of the remaking of the Su-
preme Court during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
Bush.241  Abortion opponents believed that previously futile strategies could 
pay dividends with different Justices on the Court.  The cultural and political 
climate surrounding men’s reproductive rights had also changed.  As this Part 
shows, abortion foes changed their demands; rather than arguing that all men 
had reproductive rights, anti-abortion attorneys asserted that reproductive au-
thority should turn on the individual circumstances of men and women.242  
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This Part next examines how these arguments failed in court, but also influ-
enced litigation about both abortion and assisted reproduction.243 
A. Contingent Reproductive Rights 
When abortion foes again took up the issue of reproductive rights for men 
in the late 1980s, they responded to a different political, cultural, and consti-
tutional climate.244  The most important of these, from the standpoint of abor-
tion opponents, was the change in the Supreme Court.245  Following the re-
tirement of Lewis Powell, Ronald Reagan selected Anthony Kennedy as his 
replacement, following the failed nomination of Robert Bork.246  Within a 
matter of a few years, George H.W. Bush had selected two more nominees, 
and the reconfigured Court seemed to be more promising for abortion oppo-
nents.247 
The cultural climate surrounding men’s reproductive rights also seemed 
different.  Women’s workforce participation continued to climb over the 
course of the decade, peaking in the late 1990s.248  Rates of college enrollment 
increased for both men and women.249  The 1990 census showed that women 
had surpassed men in choosing to enter college and achieved parity with men 
in completing four years of study.250  At the start of the 1990s, the increasing 
average of educational attainment carried more weight: the earnings of men 
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and women with college degrees rose significantly, while those of men with-
out a high-school degree began a steady decline.251  College-educated women 
even began to narrow the gender wage gap.252  While marriage rates continued 
to decline, women who were married and worked found themselves on the 
right side of a growing economic gap.253  As the correlation between educa-
tion, marriage, career, and financial well-being grew more pronounced, the 
stakes of reproductive decision-making seemed different for men and women, 
and the costs of unwanted or premature parenthood for women (and men) 
seemed higher. 
Pro-lifers adopted a strategy that reflected broader changes to the family.  
James Bopp Jr., the General Counsel for NRLC, began experimenting with 
men’s rights in 1988, when he represented John Smith (a pseudonym) in his 
suit to block his estranged girlfriend’s abortion.254  Smith, aged twenty-four, 
had started dating eighteen-year-old Jane Doe on New Year’s Eve.255  Less 
than a year into their relationship, Jane Doe became pregnant.256  In some 
ways, Bopp relied on the traditional narrative forged by abortion foes, casting 
John Smith as a defender of a conventional family.257  Bopp and his law part-
ner, Richard Coleson, explained that Smith, a truck driver, saw Doe as the 
love of his life and wanted to marry her.258 
However, Bopp and Coleson’s argument also recognized changes to the 
structure of the family and the public’s attitude about it.259  As more women 
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joined the workforce or pursued a college education, it was easier for abortion 
opponents to argue that unwanted parenthood would cost women vital eco-
nomic opportunities.260  Bopp and Coleson factored this into their argument, 
insisting that Jane Doe had “expressed no interest in further schooling or em-
ployment.”261  The two attorneys framed Jane Doe’s reasons as “frivolous,” 
emphasizing her “desire . . . to look nice in a bathing suit,” her wish to pre-
serve her existing relationship with John Smith, and her fear of childbirth.262  
Even if Jane Doe, like some women, were to change her mind about childbirth, 
Bopp and Coleson stressed that she could do so without impediment because 
of John Smith’s willingness to care for their child.263  The two even empha-
sized that the stigma surrounding unwed parenthood had diminished, reducing 
the social cost of having a child without marrying.264 
Rather than emphasizing the importance of the traditional family or con-
ventional gender roles, Bopp and Coleson’s new approach to men’s reproduc-
tive rights conceded the popular belief that women had sound reasons for post-
poning or rejecting parenthood.265  They maintained that Danforth had simply 
rejected state laws awarding a veto to men and argued that the courts should 
balance the reasons that each party had for making a particular procreative 
choice.266  Rather than contending that men always had reproductive rights, 
Bopp and Coleson asserted that reproductive rights should always depend on 
an individual’s reasons for seeking or avoiding parenthood.267 
Bopp and Coleson asked the family court judge to enjoin Jane Doe from 
seeking an abortion, and he agreed that John Smith’s desire to become a parent 
trumped any of Jane Doe’s reasons for seeking an abortion.268  While pursuing 
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review in the Indiana Supreme Court, Jane Doe ended her pregnancy in vio-
lation of the trial court’s order, and the appellate court in Indiana reversed the 
trial court’s decision.269 
Bopp and Coleson’s efforts attracted media attention, and more men re-
quested their help in bringing cases of their own.270  Bopp and Coleson assem-
bled a how-to guide for lawyers seeking to bring cases like John Smith’s.271  
“The right to an abortion is not an absolute one, and the courts have never said 
that it is,” Bopp stated.272  “We’re asking the court to find that there should be 
a balancing of the interests of the father against those of the mother on a case-
by-case basis.”273  Some men pursued this strategy in the hope of discouraging 
a woman from ending a pregnancy, making a decision more public or emo-
tionally traumatic.274  Others recognized that proceedings could delay an abor-
tion until more regulations kicked in or until a woman felt more reluctant to 
terminate a pregnancy.275  Bopp and Coleson, however, primarily looked for 
a way to chip away at Roe. 
To be sure, Bopp and Coleson experimented with different arguments.  
For example, when representing married men, Bopp and Coleson initially fell 
back on defenses of the traditional, patriarchal family.  But Bopp and Coleson 
increasingly relied on an individual balancing approach, as exemplified in the 
case of Erin Conn, a young father of one whose marriage was failing.276  Jen-
nifer, Conn’s estranged wife, learned she was pregnant and wanted an abor-
tion, and Bopp and Coleson tried to stop Jennifer from seeking an abortion.277   
The two highlighted that Jennifer had not expressed interest in pursuing 
education or a career.278  Conn, they suggested, would soon complete his bach-
elor’s degree and take on a better-paying managerial position at the toy store 
that employed him, which would allow him to provide for a child and wife in 
the way expected of men.279  The two attorneys cast aspersions on Jennifer’s 
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reasons for not wanting a child, saying that she primarily wanted to stop Conn 
from having custody if a child was born.280  An Indiana trial court granted an 
injunction to stop Jennifer from ending her pregnancy, which she successfully 
appealed before Bopp and Coleson asked the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari.281 
The two began by arguing that the Constitution recognized fundamental 
rights for men seeking procreation, including the right to have offspring.282  
Bopp and Coleson also compared Erin Conn to unwed fathers who were 
awarded parental rights in the Court’s jurisprudence.283  Under the Court’s 
precedents, unwed fathers gained constitutional rights by having a genetic 
connection and demonstrating concrete interest in a child.284  According to 
Bopp and Coleson, Erin Conn had a genetic connection and demonstrated 
concrete interest when he married his wife and implicitly consented to raise 
any children resulting from the marriage.285  Finally, Bopp and Coleson 
claimed that Conn’s status as a father gave him the right to have children born 
as the result of his marriage.286 
The Supreme Court refused to hear Conn v. Conn, but Bopp and Coleson 
continued taking cases, as did a network of anti-abortion lawyers across the 
country.287  Bopp and Coleson modified their approach in their later cases, 
especially when representing unmarried men.288  The two lawyers not only 
promoted the balancing test, but also used changing attitudes and facts about 
the family to their advantage.289  Bopp and Coleson suggested that at least 
some men deserved reproductive rights—and at least some women function-
ally waived abortion rights by virtue of their reasons for making a choice: 
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Regardless of the mother’s motivation, whether it be gender selection 
of her child, revenge or blackmail against the father, or some imma-
ture and near-frivolous reason—as in the case at bar—she may obtain 
an abortion without any consideration of the father’s interests.  It mat-
ters not what pledges she has made to him concerning the child, nor 
the degree of bonding already occurring between the father and child, 
nor his resources for providing for the child when born, nor the length 
of time she has carried the child, nor any other reason. . . .  Even in a 
situation where an unborn child is the only child that the father had 
ever procreated and would be able to procreate and where the inter-
ests of the mother in aborting the child are comparatively much 
weaker, the Indiana appellate courts, relying on Roe and Danforth, 
have declared that her right is absolute as against the father.290 
While urging the Court to apply rational basis review or a less demanding 
standard to abortion laws, Bopp and Coleson argued that men’s interests in 
controlling reproduction became compelling under certain circumstances, es-
pecially when women did not have good reasons for wanting an abortion.291 
How did abortion-rights supporters respond to Bopp and Coleson’s 
claims?  Jane Doe’s attorney insisted that gestation, not a woman’s reasoning 
or circumstances, always served as a constitutional tiebreaker.292  The ACLU 
spotlighted other problems with an individualized balancing, such as the un-
necessary medical risks that delays entailed, the embarrassing trials women 
were forced to go through, and the workload created for trial courts charged 
with emotional, personal disputes.293  But for the most part, the ACLU focused 
on gestation as a key distinction.294  The ACLU contended that because of 
gestation, “every adult woman ha[d] the right to decide to have an abortion 
and to effectuate that decision without government interference, regardless of 
her very personal reasons and without having to reveal those reasons.”295 
In the political arena, abortion-rights supporters made similar arguments.  
Richard Waples, one of the attorneys defending Jane Doe, argued that men’s 
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rights were nothing more than a sneaky way “to cut back a woman’s rights to 
abortion.”296  Gloria Feldt, the new leader of Planned Parenthood, played up 
the gestation distinction.297  “When [men and women] have a difference of 
opinion, we must accept the reality that it is only the woman who is pregnant; 
it is only her body which is at risk, and so, therefore, the woman must ulti-
mately be able to make that decision,” Feldt said.298  Suzanne Jacobs of NOW 
made the same point, suggesting that a man seeking fatherhood would “have 
to find himself another incubator.”299 
Arguments like Jacob’s and Feldt’s carried weight, and Bopp’s strategy 
failed.300  Citing the importance of gestation in distinguishing men and 
women’s positions, the Court never agreed to hear any men’s rights argu-
ments, and pro-life lawyers eventually turned to spousal-notification laws as 
an alternative.301  However, a focus on the parties’ individual circumstances—
the key move made by Bopp—lasted well beyond cases like Smith and Conn, 
both inside and outside the abortion context.  This Part next considers this 
history.302 
B. Abortion and Assisted Reproduction 
In 1989, a new abortion decision changed the course of debate about abor-
tion.  Webster v. Reproductive Health Services involved a constitutional chal-
lenge to a multi-restriction Missouri law.303  None of the challenged regula-
tions addressed men’s rights, but the Court nonetheless upheld the law in its 
entirety.304  As important, a plurality of the Court seemed ready to overturn 
 
 296. Joanne Lynch, Man Loses Final Appeal to Stop Wife’s Abortion, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 22, 
1988, at 2. 
 297. See 66 Percent in State Favor Abortion Rights, Study Finds, ARIZ. REP., Jan. 3, 1989, at B1. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Jac Wilder Versteeg, Sorry, Fathers Don’t Get a Choice, PALM BEACH POST, June 21, 1991, 
at 12A. 
 300. See generally Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal 
Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 41 (1989) (explaining that stake-
holders in the legal community have focused attention to the issue of spousal notification laws). 
 301. See Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988) 
(showing how the Supreme Court refused to hear a case where the main argument against an abortion 
was men’s rights). 
 302. See infra Section III.B. 
 303. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989). 
 304. See id. at 504–22. 
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Roe.305  In an earlier case, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Justice O’Connor had suggested that Roe’s trimester framework was 
“on a collision course with itself,” and she had championed a less protective 
standard, the undue-burden test.306  Four other Justices expressed skepticism 
about Roe, hinting that time had shown the trimester framework to be “un-
sound in principle and unworkable in practice.”307  Although finding no reason 
in the case at bar to overturn Roe, Webster energized abortion opponents who 
were looking to more aggressively restrict abortion.308 
Webster encouraged abortion foes to experiment with different tactics, 
especially because the Court had not been receptive to the arguments made in 
Smith and Conn.309  Nevertheless, pro-life lawyers believed that it made sense 
to home in on women’s individual circumstances and reasons for terminating 
a pregnancy.310  NRLC responded to Webster with a model law centered on a 
woman’s reasons for having an abortion.311  The statute permitted abortion 
only in cases involving rape, incest, severe fetal abnormality, and threats of 
“severe and long-lasting health damage” to a woman’s health.312  Building on 
the work done in cases like Smith and Conn, abortion foes argued that such a 
law would enjoy public support—polls showed that Americans supported le-
gal abortion only when women terminated pregnancies for certain reasons.313 
How did abortion-rights supporters respond to Webster and the new laws 
drafted in its aftermath?  Most of those in groups like the National Abortion 
Rights Action League (NARAL) and Planned Parenthood believed that Web-
ster proved that the Court would inevitably overturn Roe, and hoped to benefit 
 
 305. See id. 
 306. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452–75 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 307. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
546 (1985)). 
 308. See id. 
 309. See id. (indicating that the Court was beginning to change its view on Roe). 
 310. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 311. See Paul Houston, Abortion Opponents to Press States to Legislate Wide-Ranging Curbs, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-10-03-mn-579-story.html.  
 312. Id. (discussing new legislation being drafted in Missouri and California); see also Idaho’s 
Strict Abortion Bill Advances, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1990-03-17-mn-210-story.html; Tamar Lewin, States Testing the Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/02/us/states-testing-the-limits-on-abortion.html 
[https://nyti.ms/29woPiT]. 
 313. See Houston, supra note 311; see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 49 (2007). 
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politically from such a reversal.314  These abortion-rights supporters pointed 
to post-Webster polls that suggested that the Court’s retreat from abortion 
rights had not gone over well with voters.315  Leaders of groups like NARAL 
and the Center for Reproductive Rights believed that the best outcome might 
be a clear decision overruling Roe—a result that might help abortion-rights 
supporters on election day.316  If pro-choice politicians took control of  Con-
gress and the White House, NARAL members hoped that politicians would 
pass a law codifying abortion rights.317  However, when challenging individ-
ual restrictions, abortion-rights supporters focused on their impact on individ-
ual women.318 
Consider the litigation of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, the next abortion case that reached the Supreme Court.319  Ca-
sey involved a multi-restriction Pennsylvania law that mandated requirements 
such as counseling, spousal notification, and parental involvement before a 
woman could obtain an abortion.320  Feeling as though it was inevitable that 
the Court would overturn Roe, Kathryn Kolbert and Linda Wharton, the law-
yers challenging the law, believed that a clear decision would mobilize sup-
porters of abortion rights, and deliver the White House and Congress into pro-
choice hands.321  By contrast, an ambiguous decision might gut Roe without 
alerting voters to what had happened.322 
Kolbert and Wharton asserted that “the ‘undue-burden’ test provide[d] 
wholly inadequate protection for women seeking abortions.”323  The test—or 
 
 314. See id. 
 315. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 325 (2009), for the public’s 
reaction to Webster. 
 316. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 313, at 45–50.  
 317. See WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR 
222–25 (2003); Sue Thomas, NARAL PAC: Battling for Women’s Reproductive Rights, in AFTER THE 
REVOLUTION: PACS, LOBBIES, AND THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS (Robert Biersack et al. eds., 1999). 
 318. See infra notes 329–333 and accompanying text. 
 319. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 320. See Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990). 
 321. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 313. at 49. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 34–38, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006398. 
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any alternative to strict scrutiny—would generate “arbitrary and discrimina-
tory” results.324  Kolbert and Wharton expected the Court to uphold the law, 
but they invested most in their challenge to the spousal-notification require-
ment.325  Rather than focusing on abstract constitutional harms created by the 
law, Wharton and Kolbert contended that the record demonstrated that the 
requirement would have “potentially disastrous consequences, including sub-
jecting the woman to physical abuse.”326 
How did the threat of domestic violence matter?327  The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals had upheld most of Pennsylvania’s law, but struck down the 
spousal-notification provision.328  Pennsylvania argued in its brief that the 
Third Circuit had applied the wrong analysis by evaluating the effect of the 
law on women harmed by it rather than the law’s impact on women across the 
state.329  “To establish that a law imposes an undue burden, it surely is not 
enough . . . to show that it may deter or inhibit some women from getting an 
abortion.”330  Kolbert and Wharton conceded that most women in Pennsylva-
nia were not in an abusive relationship.331  In their view, what mattered was 
the effect on individual women—the threat of physical violence, retaliation 
“in future child custody or divorce proceedings,” and “psychological intimi-
dation or emotional harm.”332  Kolbert and Wharton maintained that individ-
ual circumstances should be dispositive because Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were “personal ones” that did not “depend on the number of persons 
who may be discriminated against.”333  The two also reiterated the importance 
of gestation as a tiebreaker in the abortion context.334 
 
 324. Id. at 36. 
 325. See id. at 40–48. 
 326. Id. at 44. 
 327. See id. at 42. 
 328. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 329. See Brief for Respondents at 83, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551421. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Reply Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 15–16, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 
91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551420 [hereinafter Reply Brief]. 
 332. Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, supra note 323, at 43. 
 333. Reply Brief, supra note 331, at 16 (quoting McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914)). 
 334. Id. at 11 (arguing that the nature of the right to privacy from Roe included “personal decisions 
that profoundly affect bodily integrity and destiny,” and not “a recognition of the importance of the 
family”); see also Brief for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, supra note 323, at 44 (“That decision, 
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Casey defied the expectations of many by declining to overturn Roe’s 
“essential holding” that the Constitution protected abortion.335  The decision 
further solidified an emerging compromise in abortion law: Because of gesta-
tion, men would have no say in abortion; but generally, in the context of re-
production, individual circumstances made a tremendous difference.336 
Like Danforth, Casey rejected a law mandating spousal involvement.337  
The Court reinforced that gestation was a key distinction in the context of 
abortion.338  “It is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with re-
spect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far greater impact on the 
mother’s liberty than on the father’s,” Casey reasoned.339  “The effect of state 
regulation on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in 
such a case, as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the 
family but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman.”340 
While reiterating the importance of gestation, Casey concluded that a 
woman’s individual circumstances were constitutionally relevant.341  “The 
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a re-
striction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant,” Casey reasoned.342  
Furthermore, the Court jettisoned Roe’s trimester framework and adopted the 
undue-burden standard as an alternative, making the effect of the law on indi-
vidual women more constitutionally relevant.343 
In the lead-up to and aftermath of Casey, the issue of men’s rights came 
up in another context: the rise of assisted reproductive technology (ART).  
 
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976))). 
 335. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 336. See infra Section III.B (discussing various individual circumstances and its impact on paternal 
rights). 
 337. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding that the 
decision to remain pregnant is solely the woman’s choice and rejecting mandating spousal involve-
ment); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–96. 
 338. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at 893 (describing circumstances where it would be dangerous for a woman to have to 
ask her husband for an abortion). 
 342. See id. at 894. 
 343. Id. at 877–83. 
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Some techniques, like artificial insemination, had been available for centu-
ries.344  In vitro fertilization (IVF) became more widespread by the 1990s.345  
As politicians and courts hashed out what rights applied in the context of as-
sisted reproduction, the idea of focusing on parties’ individual circumstances 
soon took on outsized importance.346  And to a greater extent than many real-
ized at the time, the histories of abortion and ART jurisprudence were inex-
tricably linked. 
These connections came into view during the litigation of the first major 
embryo disposition case to capture the nation’s attention.347  During her mar-
riage to Junior Davis, a refrigerator technician, Mary Sue, a secretary, experi-
enced five tubal pregnancies before turning to IVF.348  Efforts to implant the 
resulting pre-embryos in Mary Sue’s uterus were unsuccessful, and when the 
couple’s marriage ended, the two fought about what should happen to the em-
bryos.349  Initially, Mary Sue wanted to implant the embryos, but she openly 
questioned whether she could afford to raise children or emotionally endure 
the potential of losing another pregnancy.350  Junior opposed her implanting 
the embryos.351 
From the beginning, commentators asked whether abortion and ART law 
should differ.  One columnist asked whether Junior had a “greater right to 
determine [what happens to] the pre-embryos than a man who has fertilized . 
. . egg[s] in . . . the more traditional way”—or whether Mary Sue had a “greater 
right to bear her ex-husband’s child than another divorced woman.”352  Junior 
 
 344. For a history of artificial insemination, see I. GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: 
MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, AND ETHICS 378 (2015). 
 345. See J. BENJAMIN HURLBUT, EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRACY: HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH AND 
THE POLITICS OF BIOETHICS 107 (2017) (discussing in vitro fertilization). 
 346. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (balancing the parties’ individual 
circumstances to determine rights where gestation had begun).  See generally Bruce L. Wilder, As-
sisted Reproduction: Preserving Families and Protecting the Rights of Individuals, 36 HUM. RTS. 21, 
21–24 (2009). 
 347. See David Treadwell, Future Meets the Past in an Unusual Custody Battle, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
14, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-03-14-vw-704-story.html.   
 348. See Man in Divorce Wants to Keep Embryos Frozen, INDEX-J., Mar. 24, 1989, at 10 [herein-
after Man in Divorce]; Treadwell, supra note 347. 
 349. See Treadwell, supra note 347. 
 350. See, e.g., id. 
 351. See, e.g., id. 
 352. See Ellen Goodman, Pre-Embryos Present Custody Struggle, PALLADIUM-ITEM, Mar. 15, 
1989, at A6. 
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explained that he strongly opposed abortion but saw ART as different.353  “I’m 
very anti-abortion.  But [it is] still my right to decide whether to be a father,” 
Junior said.354  And he seized on the gestation distinction central to abortion 
law.  “Once (a fertilized egg) is in the womb, [it] is a woman’s right,” Junior 
said.355  “But this is not the woman’s womb.”356  Davis v. Davis took place not 
long after the Court issued a decision in Webster.357  Mary Sue put on testi-
mony that people bonded with pre-embryos and experienced parental emo-
tions even in the context of a fertility clinic.358  Junior responded that allowing 
Mary Sue to implant the embryos would make him feel “raped of [his] repro-
ductive rights.”359 
Aligning herself with the pro-life movement, Mary Sue took the position 
that the embryos were “pre-born children” and that refusing to implant them 
was murder.360  She further tried to address Junior’s arguments about the ges-
tation distinction.361  First, she contended that as a woman, she went through 
more pain as part of the IVF process and surgery than Junior.362  Her emotional 
and physical investment, she explained, should give her the power to make 
the decision.363  Second, she contended that in the IVF context, men gave more 
informed consent to the creation of a child than they did with in vivo fertili-
zation and should have less decisional power, not more.364  As part of her case, 
Mary Sue put forth testimony from Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a prominent geneti-
cist and veteran anti-abortion witness, to establish that life began at concep-
tion.365 
 
 353. See Man in Divorce, supra note 348. 
 354. Id. 
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As the judge pondered the Davis case, commentators asked how to rec-
oncile abortion and ART cases.  Abortion opponents and abortion-rights ad-
vocates were divided on the case.  Some abortion-rights supporters believed 
that defending Junior’s right to avoid reproduction would shore up women’s 
rights to end a pregnancy.366  Others believed that awarding Junior rights 
would create a precedent for giving men rights to block an abortion.367 
In September 1989, the trial judge ruled that the embryos were persons 
and that it was in their best interests to be implanted in Mary Sue.368  The 
ruling prompted the ACLU to speak out on the case, expressing concern that 
the court’s ruling conflicted with Roe.369  In 1990, the intermediate appellate 
court reversed, awarding custody of the embryos to both Junior and Mary 
Sue.370  By that time, Mary Sue had remarried and given up on the idea of 
keeping the embryos herself, and instead requested that they be donated to 
another couple.371  The court suggested that the Constitution recognized a right 
to both seek and avoid procreation.372  Without much explanation, the court 
reasoned that Junior’s interest in avoiding procreation trumped Mary Sue’s 
interest in procreating.373  “Awarding the fertilized ova to Mary Sue for im-
plantation against Junior’s will, in our view, constitutes impermissible state 
action in violation of Junior’s constitutionally protected right not to beget a 
child where no pregnancy has taken place,” the court explained.374 
With the Supreme Court’s composition up for grabs, Mary Sue appealed 
to the Tennessee Supreme Court and modified her arguments.375  At oral ar-
gument, both sides focused partly on the status of the pre-embryos.376  Mary 
Sue’s attorney argued that in disputed cases, the tiebreaker should go to the 
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party who was seeking to bring a life into the world.377  “When the crea-
tors . . . of potential life are unable to agree on its disposition, the creator who 
seeks to protect that potential life should prevail,” her attorney asserted.378 
Shortly before the Supreme Court issued a decision in Casey, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court handed down a ruling in Davis—one that bore the influ-
ence of the compromise forged in abortion law.379  The parties clearly had no 
written contract.380  The court declined to treat the decision to use IVF as a 
binding agreement.381  Nor did the court think that the state’s interest in pre-
serving fetal life should receive serious consideration.382  Davis looked to state 
statutes and to Roe, suggesting that the state’s interest in life grew as preg-
nancy progressed.383  Given that the pre-embryos had undergone much less 
development than a fetus even earlier in pregnancy, the court reasoned that 
the government had no interest that could outweigh those of individual gamete 
providers.384 
The court then recognized two rights at stake in the case: the right to seek 
and the right to avoid procreation.385  Davis described these rights as holding 
“equal significance.”386  What, then, served as a tiebreaker?  The court again 
fell back on gestation as a distinction.387  Indeed, the court acknowledged that 
IVF demanded more of women.388  “None of the concerns about a woman’s 
bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion 
decisions [are] applicable here,” Davis explained.389  Davis boiled down the 
complex logic of procreative rights in Roe and its progeny to a single idea: 
“genetic parenthood.”390 
 
 377. See Frozen Embryos’ Fate, supra note 375, at 4B. 
 378. Id. 
 379. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595, 604–05.  
 380. See id. at 595–98. 
 381. See id. 
 382. See id. at 602–03. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. 
 385. See id. at 601 (explaining how the right to procreate and right to avoid procreation each have 
significance in this case). 
 386. Id. 
 387. See id. at 600–02. 
 388. See id. at 601. 
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When the gestational tiebreaker was not in place, how should courts pro-
ceed?  Rather than considering the right to seek or avoid procreation in the 
abstract, Davis centered on each parties’ “particular circumstances, as re-
vealed in the record.”391  In addition to the “financial and psychological con-
sequences” of unwanted parenthood, the court emphasized Junior’s experi-
ences of being raised in a group home, enduring estrangement from his father, 
and missing additional time from his mother.392  The court further noted that 
Mary Sue no longer sought to procreate at all, which made her circumstances 
less compelling.393  Mary Sue’s circumstances also factored into the court’s 
analysis.394  Because she could theoretically adopt or seek to become a genetic 
parent through IVF, her loss of prospective parenthood was less permanent 
than would be Junior’s becoming a parent against his will.395 
Davis established that the compromise forged in abortion doctrine would 
influence ART jurisprudence as well.396  The court reduced a series of com-
plex questions about gender, autonomy, and the relative weight of seeking and 
avoiding procreation asked in the abortion context to a single idea: gestational 
parenthood.397  In abortion cases, the court suggested, the parent who gestated 
a pregnancy gained the ability to make reproductive decisions.  Without un-
derstanding the unintended consequences of doing so, abortion-rights support-
ers had urged the courts to use gestation as a reason to give women sole con-
trol over the abortion decision even when men tried to intervene.398  Although 
rejecting gestation as a deciding factor, abortion foes often said less about the 
importance of gestation, instead asking the courts to focus on the parties’ in-
dividual circumstances.399  Casey and other abortion cases adopted a middle-
ground position: using gestation as a tiebreaker in the abortion context, but 
also underlining the importance of individual circumstances in determining 
the contours of reproductive rights.400  Part IV explores the extent to which 
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this compromise still informs the law on both abortion and ART and examines 
the unexpected costs that a balancing approach has exacted.401 
IV. GENERALIZING INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
What are the legacies of this compromise in the laws of both abortion and 
ART?402  This Part begins by exploring post-Davis embryo disposition 
cases.403  Next, this Part evaluates the legacy of the gestation compromise in 
the abortion context.404  Finally, this Part proposes ways of resolving questions 
of men’s reproductive rights that go beyond the gestation distinction.405 
A. The Gestation Compromise in ART 
Some courts rejected the approach taken in Davis.  For example, in A.Z. 
v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the right to avoid 
genetic parenthood always trumps countervailing interests.406  “[P]rior agree-
ments to enter into familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not 
be enforced against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions,” 
A.Z. reasoned.407  “This enhances the ‘freedom of personal choice in matters 
of marriage and family life.’”408  Three years later, the Iowa Supreme Court 
likewise refused to adopt Davis’s approach.409  In In re Marriage of Witten, 
the court concluded that either party could change her mind at any time about 
procreation regardless of any prior agreement on the subject.410  Under Witten, 
if the parties could not agree, the status quo would prevail, and neither could 
use or dispose of the embryos.411 
But for the most part, after Davis, courts followed a similar strategy of 
enforcing a valid agreement if one could be found, and then balancing the 
 
 401. See infra Part IV. 
 402. See infra Section IV.A. 
 403. See infra Section IV.A. 
 404. See infra Section IV.B. 
 405. See infra Part IV.C. 
 406. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058–59 (Mass. 2000). 
 407. Id. at 1059. 
 408. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 
V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974))). 
 409. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 410. See id. at 775–84. 
 411. Id. at 778. 
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parties’ individual circumstances when it was hard to identify an adequate 
agreement.  In J.B. v. M.B., for example, a woman sought to have pre-embryos 
destroyed while her estranged husband asked that the embryos be donated or 
implanted.412  Although the parties had signed a consent form before begin-
ning IVF, the court found that it evinced no clear intent about what should 
happen to the embryos in the event of divorce.413  The court then balanced the 
parties’ individualized circumstances, emphasizing that M.B. already had 
children and that there were no signs that he was infertile or unable to have 
more.414  Although J.B. suggested that the right to avoid procreation usually 
carries more weight, J.B.’s personal situation heavily influenced the court’s 
decision.415 
A similar scenario arose in Reber v. Reiss.416  In that case, the court also 
found no enforceable agreement and balanced the parties’ competing inter-
ests.417  The court stressed that the woman seeking procreation was over forty 
and had undergone chemotherapy for breast cancer, making it likely that she 
could only achieve genetic parenthood through the implantation of the dis-
puted embryos.418  The court emphasized the woman’s desire to experience 
pregnancy.419  Moreover, as the court saw it, her past health troubles and age 
made it less likely that she could successfully adopt a child.420  For his part, 
her former partner resented the idea of a genetic child growing up without him 
and did not want the financial responsibility that would accompany the birth 
of a child.421  The court downplayed these concerns, emphasizing that the 
man’s wife would allow him to have a relationship with his child if he wished, 
and ruled that the woman was allowed to implant the embryos if she wished.422 
The unpredictability of the balancing test was on display again in Szaf-
ranski v. Dunston.423  In that case, an unmarried man sought to stop his ex-
 
 412. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001). 
 413. See id. at 713. 
 414. See id. at 716–17. 
 415. See id. 
 416. See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. 2012). 
 417. See id. at 1136. 
 418. See id. at 1138–40. 
 419. See id. 
 420. See id. 
 421. See id. at 1140–42. 
 422. See id. 
 423. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, 34 N.E.3d 1132. 
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girlfriend from implanting embryos against his will.424  The court found no 
enforceable agreement and turned to the parties’ individual interests.425  Karla, 
the woman, had suffered ovarian failure as the result of chemotherapy, and 
she desperately wanted a genetic child who might remind her of her father, 
who died when she was five years old.426  Jacob, by contrast, cited his loss of 
a love interest, the stigma he felt in fathering a child he did not love, and the 
difficulty he would have in attracting a future partner.427  While recognizing 
the potential costs of unwanted genetic parenthood, the court stressed that Ja-
cob might have no trouble attracting a partner, and thus concluded that Karla’s 
interests should prevail.428 
What could be wrong with paying so much attention to the parties’ indi-
vidual circumstances?  The history of efforts to determine reproductive rights 
by looking at the parties’ individual circumstances offers reason for caution.  
Abortion foes turned to a balancing strategy partly because they believed that 
judges would denigrate certain reasons for seeking (or avoiding) parenthood.  
While a judge may sympathize with a woman’s desire to pursue an education 
or a career, for example, pro-life attorneys bet that women seeking a clean 
break with an ex-lover or women afraid of the pain of childbirth would receive 
a more negative response.429  These attorneys played to mainstream generali-
zations about what the family should look like and what counted as a good 
enough reason to swear off a traditional relationship.430 
In the ART context today, focusing on individual circumstances can cre-
ate similar problems.  In Szafranski, for example, the court attached far less 
significance to a man’s concern about his ability to find a romantic partner 
than it did a woman’s desire to bear a child who was genetically related to 
her.431  While the number of people without children has declined in recent 
years, the percentage of those who voluntarily remain childfree has in-
creased.432  Decisions like Szafranski disproportionately affect those who do 
 
 424. See id. ¶ 2. 
 425. See id. ¶ 5. 
 426. See id. ¶ 8. 
 427. See id. ¶ 22. 
 428. See id. ¶ 5. 
 429. See supra Part III. 
 430. See supra Part III. 
 431. Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 124–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162–63. 
 432. See, e.g., Joseph Chamie & Barry Mirkin, Childless by Choice, YALE U.: YALEGLOBAL 
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not wish to have children or view their ability to find or keep a romantic part-
ner as more important. 
Courts also tend to assume that the emotional payoff of procreation de-
pends on the number of children a person already has—a conclusion that pe-
nalizes the increasingly small number of people with large families.433  Afri-
can-Americans and Latinos are far more likely to have large families than are 
those of other races: according to recent Pew Research Center data, signifi-
cantly more African-Americans and Latinos had three or four or more children 
than did parents in other groups.434  By suggesting that the decision to become 
a genetic parent carries more weight than does the decision to have an addi-
tional genetic child, courts tend to advantage those in racial groups that con-
form to the trend of shrinking family size.435 
Courts also make assumptions about a party’s ability to have future chil-
dren through IVF or adoption that may be unrealistic for many people with 
reduced financial means.436  In 2018, the average IVF cycle cost $12,000, not 
including fertility drugs, which can add an extra $3,000 to $5,000.437  Many 
patients report spending more than $60,000 on IVF, and states often provide 
incomplete insurance coverage or none at all.438  Even middle-class couples 
and individuals routinely take out private loans, loans against their retirement 
funds, or drain their savings accounts.439  For low-income consumers, IVF will 
often be financially out of reach. 
And courts have been more convinced that unwanted genetic parenthood 
 
ONLINE (Mar. 2, 2012), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/childless-choice; see also Claire Cain Mil-
ler, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-rate-is-down-yet-more-women-are-
mothers.html [https://nyti.ms/2FRAQxC] (discussing the decrease in the number of women who had 
no children by forty-five). 
 433. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716–17 (N.J. 2001); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140–
42 (Pa. 2012). 
 434. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RES. CTR., CHILDLESSNESS FALLS, FAMILY SIZE GROWS 
AMONG HIGHLY EDUCATED WOMEN 10 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/3/2015/05/2015-05-07_children-ever-born_FINAL.pdf. 
 435. See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (“M.B.’s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an oppor-
tunity to use or donate the pre-embryos.  M.B. is already a father and is able to become a father to 
additional children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization.”). 
 436. See, e.g., id. at 716–17; Reber, 42 A.3d at 1140–42. 
 437. See Nina Bahadur, The Cost of Infertility, SELF (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.self.com/story/the-
cost-of-infertility. 
 438. See, e.g., id. 
 439. See id. 
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will be traumatic when a party can point to childhood experiences of divorce 
or abandonment, undervaluing the potential harms suffered by people who 
have different reasons for refusing or postponing genetic parenthood.440  Sur-
veys of millennials, for example, show that some wish not to have children 
because of the feared impact of overpopulation and the strain more people put 
on the environment.441  Others report their lacking maternal or paternal in-
stincts.442  Still others wish to prioritize their careers or lead a lifestyle that 
seems incompatible with children.443  Some have no clearly articulable reason 
beyond simply wanting to remain childfree.444  Courts have shown sympathy 
to parties who have had traumatic childhoods and who, as a result, wish to 
avoid parenthood or to have a genetic child raised in a certain setting.445  How-
ever, in the ART setting, parties have a harder time justifying their wish not 
to become genetic parents.446 
Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the idea of forcing someone to justify a 
decision to seek or avoid procreation with the idea that one has a right to do 
either one.  To the extent that the Constitution protects a right to seek or avoid 
procreation, a person may have deeply personal, even idiosyncratic reasons 
for making a choice.447  The Court has suggested that reproductive decisions 
enjoy protection regardless of a person’s reasons for choosing a certain op-
tion.448  Conditioning the availability of a right on the existence of an appeal-
ing story undermines the very idea that the Constitution protects reproductive 
liberty. 
 
 440. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992). 
 441. See, e.g., Nicolas DiDomizio, 11 Brutally Honest Reasons Millennials Don’t Want Kids, MIC 
(July 30, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/123051/why-millennials-dont-want-kids#.A5Y4CQqMF; 
Jillian Kramer, One-Third of Millennials Don’t Want Kids, GLAMOUR (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://www.glamour.com/story/millennials-dont-want-kids. 
 442. See DiDimozio, supra note 441. 
 443. See id. 
 444. See id. 
 445. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603–04 (holding that appellants’ “severe problems caused by sepa-
ration from parents” outweighed appellees’ interest in donating embryos). 
 446. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 126–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–
63 (holding that a man’s loss of love interest, interest in not wanting the stigma of fathering a child he 
did not love, and difficulty in finding a future partner were outweighed by the woman’s interest in 
implanting embryos). 
 447. See DiDimozio, supra note 441. 
 448. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“The destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and 
her place in society.”). 
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Abortion opponents fully understood the tension between an individual-
ized balancing approach and the recognition of a fundamental right to abor-
tion.449  By suggesting that some women did not have a good enough reason 
to make an abortion decision, abortion foes hoped to establish that women had 
no right to terminate a pregnancy.450  And pro-lifers hoped that if some men 
could tell a moving story, then the courts would recognize a compelling inter-
est that would trump any abortion right women retained.451 
A similar issue exists in the ART context.452  What does it mean to have 
a right to avoid genetic parenthood if that right depends on a person’s reasons 
for making a choice?  As technologies evolve, the dimensions of reproductive 
rights have been increasingly uncertain.  Balancing analyses send a contradic-
tory message about what rights anyone has when it comes to genetic 
parenthood. 
Focusing on individual circumstances also tends to create bad law.  In 
cases like Smith and Conn, abortion opponents hoped that courts would gen-
eralize about men’s reproductive rights based on the compelling story of a 
single litigant.453  For example, in Smith, Smith’s attorneys pointed to Jane 
Doe’s interest in her appearance and her intimate relationship to establish that 
some women (and perhaps many women) lacked a justification for ending a 
pregnancy.454 
Courts in contemporary ART cases have similarly drawn broad conclu-
sions based partly on the facts of individual cases.  In Davis, for example, the 
court paid considerable attention to Junior’s extremely painful childhood and 
the fact that Mary Sue no longer wanted to implant the embryos herself.455  
Then, with little explanation, the court held that the right to avoid procreation 
usually trumps the right to seek it.456  This may well be the right conclusion, 
 
 449. See supra Part III. 
 450. See supra Part III. 
 451. See supra Part III. 
 452. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (weighing the husband’s 
interest in not having children raised in a one parent home because of his past traumatic childhood 
experience with the divorce of his parents as greater than the wife’s interests in donating the embryos).  
But see Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 126–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–63 
(weighing the husband’s interest in future romantic relationships as less than the wife’s interest in 
having children). 
 453. See supra Section III.A. 
 454. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 258, at 16. 
 455. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600–04. 
 456. See id. 
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but it is far from obvious, and Davis at most suggested that the right to avoid 
procreation was weightier because any violation of it would be permanent 
(whereas a party seeking children could theoretically have them in other 
ways).457  But Davis did not do much to theorize the harms of having an un-
wanted genetic child in the world—a task with which courts have struggled 
with other contexts, such as tort cases for wrongful birth and wrongful life, in 
which judges have had a notoriously hard time pinpointing how (and how 
badly) a party is injured by the birth of a genetically related child.458 
Consider the question of damages.  Courts are most willing to recognize 
a tort for wrongful birth when a parent can show unique medical expenses that 
accompany the birth of a child with unusual needs.459  But in the context of 
wrongful birth or wrongful life, courts have had a harder time explaining the 
harm suffered by a healthy (but unplanned) child by virtue of being born or 
the injuries suffered by someone who does not want to become a parent.460  
Dov Fox has convincingly shown that the difficulty of putting a number on 
these injuries does not make them any less real or worthy of recognition.461  
But the laws of wrongful birth and wrongful life show that courts have their 
work cut out for them in theorizing the harms inherent in unwanted genetic 
parenthood (or an unfulfilled desire for genetic parenthood).462  Starting from 
the facts of the individual cases tends to blind the courts to the many key 
questions that should be answered rather than pointing the way to a better 
 
 457. See id. 
 458. See id.  For more on the challenges that courts have faced in addressing wrongful life and 
wrongful birth cases, see Alan B. Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 500 (1989), 
which notes that all jurisdictions faced with wrongful birth and/or wrongful life claims “have struggled 
mightily with its perplexing legal and moral issues.”  See also Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact 
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005); Michael 
B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 507–08, 589 
(1991). 
 459. See Daniel W. Whitney & Kenneth N. Rosenbaum, Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Birth, 
32 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 190–97 (2011) (summarizing the majority rule among courts that recognize 
wrongful birth that the action permits, at a minimum, damages measured by the extraordinary cost, at 
least through minority, of supporting the child with severe birth defects) (quotation omitted). 
 460. See Michael T. Murtaugh, Wrongful Birth: The Courts’ Dilemma in Determining a Remedy 
for a “Blessed Event,” 27 PACE L. REV. 241, 248 (2007) (stating that in wrongful birth causes of 
action, courts have focused on the health of the unplanned child to determine the extent of the parents’ 
injury). 
 461. See Fox, supra note 5, at 224. 
 462. Id. at 211–13 (explaining the many considerations and benefits of more regulatory oversight 
of procreation rights). 
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answer.463 
In generalizing from the parties’ individual circumstances, courts consist-
ently grapple with the specific harms of having an unwanted genetic child (or 
the harms of being unable to have a wanted genetic child).464  In defining the 
rights of unwed fathers, the Supreme Court has at times said that a genetic 
connection matters because it creates an opportunity for parents to bond with 
their children.465  But the importance of genetic parenthood remains poorly 
explained, especially as genetic science advances.466  Does genetic parenthood 
matter because of the cultural expectations many hold about the connection 
someone shares with genetic parents?  Or because of medical, personal, or 
cultural information known to a genetic parent?  Or because of a person’s 
ambivalence about parenting?  Because, as in Junior Davis’s case, a party has 
strong preferences about how a genetic child is raised?  The contours and 
power of a fundamental right could differ significantly depending on the an-
swers to these questions. 
And what about the right to seek genetic parenthood?  In generalizing 
from the stories of a specific party, the courts have sometimes suggested that 
there is a right to seek genetic parenthood as opposed to some other kind of 
parental relationship.  There is no doubt that genetic parenthood is unique, just 
as adoptive parenthood is unique.  It is less obvious why one form of 
parenthood should be more valued than others. The answer to this question 
requires full briefing and argument, not a simple extrapolation from the facts 
of a specific case. 
Moreover, the unpredictability involved in individualized balancing can 
have the kind of chilling effect sought out by abortion opponents in the 
1980s.467  Without knowing in advance how moving a judge will find a per-
son’s story, a party will feel far from confident that she will have a right to 
seek or avoid procreation.  This uncertainty is more troubling in the context 
 
 463. See id. at 153–57 (explaining the types of cases courts have attempted to handle and the pitfalls 
of an individualized case approach).  
 464. Id. at 159–61 (describing the author’s proposal for court treatment of parents’ inability to re-
produce with specific genetic traits). 
 465. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
 466. See Fox, supra note 5, at 160; see also Robert VerBruggen, The Genetics of Parenting, INS. 
FOR FAM. STUD. (July 25, 2018), https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-genetics-of-parenting (summarizing re-
cent studies researching the impact of genetic connection on parent and child interactions). 
 467. See supra Section III.B. 
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of ART.  When using ART, parties account for the uncertainty that a preg-
nancy will come to term.  Nevertheless, ART holds out the promise of in-
creased legal or practical control for those who use it.  An unpredictable bal-
ancing standard undermines these expectations. 
The history of the gestation compromise should give pause to those happy 
with a balancing approach.  To be sure, gestation matters.  Pregnancy is a 
unique experience for women that carries its own psychological and physical 
risks.  But in the 1980s, as Roe seemed increasingly under threat, abortion-
rights supporters used gestation as a way out of a more complicated conver-
sation about why women should have abortion rights.  While trying to move 
beyond the gestation distinction, abortion opponents proposed an alternative 
distinction: the individuals’ reasons for making a reproductive decision.  The 
Court struck a compromise between the two, treating gestation as decisive in 
the abortion context but suggesting that individual circumstances generally 
took on paramount importance. 
The difficulties with pregnancy and childbirth always did—and should—
play a role in the debate about abortion rights.468  Pregnancy and childbirth 
remain more dangerous for women in the United States than for those in other 
countries.469  The threat of harm to women of color is even higher.470  And the 
laws protecting against pregnancy discrimination still has real gaps in the pro-
tection it provides.471  In 2015, the Supreme Court made it easier for women 
to challenge accommodation policies that systematically disadvantage preg-
nant women.472  But the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act still does not 
require employers to accommodate pregnant women in any way.473  Preg-
nancy carries career risks as well as the possibility of physical injury. 
But before and after the 1980s, the reasons for recognizing abortion rights 
 
 468. See, e.g., Kate Womersley, Why Giving Birth Is Safer in Britain Than in the U.S., PROPUBLICA 
(Aug. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-giving-birth-is-safer-in-britain-
than-in-the-u-s. 
 469. See id. 
 470. See Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Nothing Protects Black Women from Dying in Pregnancy 
and Childbirth, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/nothing-
protects-black-women-from-dying-in-pregnancy-and-childbirth. 
 471. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978). 
 472. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343–44 (2015) (requiring courts to 
consider the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats 
non-pregnant workers). 
 473. See id. at 1349–50 (holding only that employers cannot deny pregnant workers accommoda-
tions that are being offered to other workers who have a similar inability to work). 
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went well beyond bodily integrity.  Some of those reasons involved potential 
problems with the justifications for abortion laws, including those that may 
have been based on sex stereotypes or on religious beliefs.474  Reva Siegel and 
other scholars have studied the extent to which assumptions about mother-
hood animate abortion regulations.475  Moreover, while the Supreme Court has 
rejected challenges to abortion regulations under the Free Exercise or Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment, arguments linking religion to pro-
life sentiment have taken on new importance.476  In recent years, women have 
looked to state equivalents of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in as-
serting that abortion laws infringe on their own deeply held faith-based con-
victions.477  By focusing so much on gestation, abortion-rights supporters in-
advertently helped to obscure how these important considerations influenced 
the debate on men’s reproductive rights. 
The emphasis on gestation also draws attention away from the post-preg-
nancy consequences of carrying a child to term, for both men and women.  At 
a minimum, carrying a pregnancy to term would involve unwanted genetic 
parenthood for a man, a woman, or both.  And for many women, given the 
frequency of single-parent homes and the share of childcare performed by 
women, giving birth to a child will entail child-rearing commitments.478  
These consequences fall unevenly on Americans of different races and educa-
tional backgrounds.479  Even among those in two-parent households, research 
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NEWS TODAY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/319687.php. 
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suggests that women still perform more childcare than men.480  During the 
1970s and 1980s, those on both sides of the abortion debate asked important 
questions about the extent to which reproductive decisions should have any 
relationship to subsequent childrearing duties, but because the courts adopted 
the gestation distinction, these questions largely remained unanswered.481  The 
relationship between childbirth and subsequent childcare responsibilities de-
serves more exploration. 
And conversations about men’s reproductive rights went beyond the abor-
tion context—addressing whether child support obligations should carry any 
related rights, whether child-rearing tasks should match authority to make re-
productive decisions, whether men’s interest in having a genetic child (or a 
genetic child within marriage, or with a specific woman) should be constitu-
tionally significant.482  For the most part, case law on these subjects seems 
distinct and unrelated.  In the abortion context, disputes between men and 
women came down to women’s gestational capacity.483  In child support cases, 
courts often looked at the statutory purpose of child support laws and the lack 
of state action undermining any constitutional protection.484  For some liti-
gants, this failure to harmonize related bodies of law creates a sense that the 
law is incoherent or unjust. 
Often, abortion-rights supporters navigated these complicated questions 
by directing attention to the simplest distinction between men and women: 
gestation.485  This strategy had obvious advantages.  Gestation obviously dif-
ferentiates men and women.  The difference in gestational capacity does not 
require thoughtful analysis or open the door to unpredictable results.  And the 
gestation distinction seemed likely to shore up abortion rights: whenever there 
was a conflict between men and women, women’s gestational capacity meant 
 
in the United States from 1990 to 2016, CHILD TRENDS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.child-
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 482. See supra Section II.C. 
 483. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 71 (1976). 
 484. See L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983). 
 485. See supra text accompanying note 48 (describing the preference for women’s rights due to 
gestational capacity). 
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that abortion rights would be safe.486  But the court increasingly viewed repro-
ductive rights, but for the fact of gestation, as a matter of individual motives 
and circumstances.487  This move has made ART jurisprudence less princi-
pled, less transparent, and less well-explained than it ought to have been.488 
What legacy has the gestation compromise had in abortion law?  Most 
obviously, the Court has struck down spousal-involvement laws, while per-
forming an individualized balancing in other contexts.489  To be sure, balanc-
ing to some extent reflects the Court’s approach to abortion.490  Because Casey 
treats the government’s interest in protecting life as important, the Court gives 
weight to both women’s reproductive liberty and the government’s interest in 
fetal life.491  However, the nature of this balancing test—and the Court’s fact-
intensive, individualized, case-by-case focus—has created problems, many of 
them connected to the original gestation compromise.492  The next section 
studies these issues.493 
B. Individualized Balancing and Abortion 
In Casey and a subsequent decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Heller-
stedt, in 2016, the Court has evaluated abortion regulations by looking at their 
impact on individual women.494  Abortion and ART law are certainly different 
in salient ways.  In ART cases, courts tend to balance the constitutional inter-
ests of specific men and women making reproductive decisions.495  By con-
trast, for the most part, in abortion cases, the Court balances the government’s 
interests against the burden a law places on specific individuals.496  But the 
costs of individualized balancing are similar across either domain. 
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Casey and its progeny emphasized that abortion rights belong to individ-
ual women—and depend on their specific circumstances.497  This conclusion 
has spawned ongoing uncertainty about precisely what is being balanced—or 
what weight should be attached to specific variables.498  Ever since Casey 
came down, for example, the lower courts have battled about how many 
women a law must affect before a law is unduly burdensome.499  Casey 
seemed to answer this question: the relevant group was those “for whom the 
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”500 
But the Court’s decision left many questions unanswered.  Consider the 
debate that preceded Whole Woman’s Health.501  That case concerned two 
Texas laws.502  One required a doctor performing abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.503  A second mandated that abortion 
clinics comply with the regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.504  
The parties agreed that if the law went into effect that all but a handful of 
clinics would close.505  Texas argued that the best way to measure a burden 
was to look at the number of women affected in the entire state.506  Those 
challenging the law insisted that the relevant group was women who did not 
live near one of the remaining clinics.507 
Whole Woman’s Health repeated Casey’s conclusion that judges should 
ask whether a law mattered to “a large fraction of cases in which [the provision 
at issue] is relevant.”508  What did this mean?  Whole Woman’s Health stated 
that this group was a “class narrower than ‘all women,’ ‘pregnant women,’ or 
 
 497. See id. at 875–78. 
 498. See Leah Libresco, The Supreme Court’s Test for Abortion Laws Is a Poorly Defined Math 
Problem, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 3, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-
test-for-abortion-laws-is-a-poorly-defined-math-problem/ (parsing the variables at play in abortion de-
bates). 
 499. See id. 
 500. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. 
 501. See generally Due Process Clause—Undue Burden: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2016). 
 502. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 503. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2015), invalidated 
by Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 504. See id. § 245.010(a), invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
 505. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301–04.  
 506. See, e.g., Libresco, supra note 498. 
 507. See id. 
 508. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)). 
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even ‘the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State.’”509  But 
the meaning of this large fraction remains up for grabs.  Writing in dissent, 
Justice Alito suggested that if a law impacted any women, it would satisfy 
Whole Woman’s Health’s definition of a large fraction.510  Is Alito correct? 
And what must be shown to demonstrate that a large fraction of individual 
women face a burden?  In Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Okla-
homa v. Jegley, the Eighth Circuit considered a law requiring, among other 
things, that doctors performing medication abortions have hospital admitting 
privileges and a contract with a physician who could help in cases of medical 
emergencies.511  Relying on Whole Woman’s Health, the district court had 
enjoined the law, concluding that it was likely unconstitutional.512  The Eighth 
Circuit reversed, suggesting that the district court had not made adequate find-
ings about the number of women affected.513  What number counts as a large 
fraction?  How much proof must those challenging a regulation have to show 
that they have done the math correctly?  Casey’s individualized balancing in-
vites this kind of uncertainty. 
Casey’s individualized balancing also has created confusion about what 
judges should weigh and how important each variable is.  In Whole Woman’s 
Health, the Court found that Texas’s HB2 delivered no benefits while creating 
a significant burden.514  But what should happen if a law does have a benefit 
but is significantly burdensome?  Or how should courts evaluate a law that 
has no benefit but is only minimally burdensome?  And does the balancing 
analysis detailed in Whole Woman’s Health apply to all abortion regulations, 
or only a subset, such as those involving statutes claimed to protect women’s 
health? 
Nor has the Court clarified whether the individualized impact of a law 
should include consideration of how a woman experiences a particular regu-
lation in isolation versus as part of an overarching statutory scheme.  Whole 
Woman’s Health suggested that the latter was true: the Court evaluated the 
combined effect of both challenged parts of HB2.515  But does this approach 
 
 509. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). 
 510. See id. at 2342–42 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 511. See 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 512. See Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, No. 4:15-cv-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 
6211310, *10–32 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 4, 2016). 
 513. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 957–60. 
 514. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–17. 
 515. See id. 
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extend only to regulations challenged in a given case?  Or does it make more 
sense to consider all abortion restrictions on the books in a state or even all 
laws that impact abortion access, such as laws regulating the disposal of fetal 
remains? 
C. Alternatives 
What alternative to individualized balancing should the courts adopt?  In 
embryo-disposition cases, courts already prefer to honor contracts or in-
formed-consent agreements detailing what should happen in the event of a 
separation or divorce.516  To be sure, some have expressed skepticism about a 
contract-based approach, suggesting that it may be unconstitutional or at least 
unwise to bind someone to a past reproductive decision even after she changes 
her mind.517  This is a valid concern, but for some time, the law has bound 
people to past reproductive decisions.  After the point of fetal viability, for 
example, a woman may no longer terminate a pregnancy regardless of her 
current views on the matter.518  In the context of in vivo reproduction, men 
have a right to access contraception but cannot force a woman to end or con-
tinue a pregnancy.519  In general, the Court has suggested that reproductive 
rights require an ability to make informed decisions, not the power to change 
one’s mind at any time for any reason.520 
And alternatives, like the mutual contemporaneous consent approach out-
lined in In re Marriage of Witten, create problems of their own.521  Witten 
functionally allows the party who favors the status quo to prevail.522  Signifi-
 
 516. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶ 117, 34 N.E.3d 1142, 1157–58 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2015). 
 517. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 595 (Colo. 2018); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
588, 598–605 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Dahl, 
194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 53–55 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 518. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–82 (1992). 
 519. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (“The obvious facts 
is that when the wife and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage 
partners can prevail.  Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more 
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her 
favor.”). 
 520. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–82. 
 521. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 775–84 (Iowa 2003). 
 522. See id. 
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cantly, when a couple is divorcing or separating, Witten could allow one part-
ner to effectively hold embryos hostage in exchange for a more favorable fi-
nancial settlement.523  At the point that a relationship is ending, a partner might 
be inclined to punish an ex regardless of her views about reproduction.524 
A contract-based approach could encourage people to make more 
thoughtful decisions about genetic parenthood.525  States should pass laws 
governing the formation and enforcement of embryo disposition agreements.  
In other ART contexts, state laws already provide clear requirements for those 
seeking to enter into an enforceable contract.526  For example, statutes on sur-
rogacy contracts set age limits, restrict who may enter into a binding surrogacy 
agreement, and regulate the terms that such contracts must include.527  And in 
family law more broadly, states set limits governing marital agreements.528  
There is no reason that states could not encourage similarly responsible con-
tracting around the idea of embryo disposition. 
What might such a model law look like?  Perhaps the closest analogy is 
to prenuptial agreements.  Just as couples enter into embryo disposition agree-
ments before beginning IVF, couples sign prenuptial agreements before a 
marriage begins.529  In both contexts, people may suffer from optimism bias, 
underestimating the chances of conflict down the line.530  And just as those 
 
 523. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business): 
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1210 (2009). 
 524. See, e.g., id. at 1225. 
 525. Id. at 1224; c.f. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce, and Family Law Contract-
ing: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 422 (2013). 
 526. See infra note 527–528 and accompanying text. 
 527. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806 (2019); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/25 (LexisNexis 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2019); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 742.15 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 528. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g (2019); NH REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2-a (2019); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-3-501 (2019). 
 529. See Prenuptial Agreements: Who Needs It and How Do I Make One?, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agreements-overview-29569.html (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2019). 
 530. Forman, supra note 525, at 421; Ian Smith, The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts, 
17 J. ECON. SURVS. 208 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=416650 (describing the significance of op-
timism bias in the entry to premarital agreements). 
 [Vol. 47: 665, 2020] Men’s Reproductive Rights 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
725 
soon to be wed may not adequately protect their interests, most couples be-
ginning IVF will not bargain at arms’ length.531  Although states take consid-
erably different approaches to regulating prenuptial agreements, and although 
prenuptial and embryo-disposition agreements differ in salient ways, the Uni-
form Premarital Agreements Act (UPAA) may provide a helpful starting 
point.532 
The UPAA has both procedural and substantive requirements.533  Proce-
durally, the UPAA requires that an agreement be voluntary, that both parties 
have had the chance to consult independent legal counsel or clearly waived 
their rights, and that both parties had a full disclosure of the assets and liabil-
ities of the other.534  Substantively, the UPAA allows courts to require addi-
tional support payments to avoid making one partner eligible for public assis-
tance.535  Courts also have the power to refuse enforcement of an agreement 
that is unconscionable at the time of signing or if substantial hardship would 
arise because of a material change in circumstances following the signing of 
the agreement.536 
In the embryo-disposition context, it makes sense to require that couples 
have access to independent counsel and the financial means of obtaining it.  
In a legal field with many complex, unsettled questions, those beginning IVF 
could use legal guidance and help understanding how to protect themselves.537  
Few embryo disposition agreements may be involuntary, and financial disclo-
sure may be less relevant in the IVF context because disputes tend to involve 
the achievement or avoidance of genetic parenthood rather than financial mat-
ters.  However, a model statute should address the financial consequences of 
bringing a pregnancy to term, especially in cases in which one of the parties 
no longer intends to play a role in a child’s life. 
What about substantive requirements?  States could consider limiting the 
enforcement of embryo disposition agreements under circumstances that 
 
 531. Cf. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972) (making this point in the con-
text of prenuptial agreements).  
 532. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
 533. See id. § 9. 
 534. See id. 
 535. See id. 
 536. See id. 
 537. See Anna El-Zein, Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 82 
MO. L. REV. 881, 901–04 (2017) (discussing a requirement of independent counsel before a cryopres-
ervation agreement is presumed to be enforceable). 
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might seem unconscionable, allowing lawmakers and voters to weigh in on 
what would make unwanted genetic parenthood untenable.538  Regardless of 
the details of such a statute, putting in place requirements for such a contract 
would encourage contracting parties to take embryo disposition decisions 
more seriously and to enter into agreements that better reflect their intentions. 
What about the balancing required in abortion law?  There are reasons for 
preserving some form of balancing analysis in the abortion context: Casey 
recognized that abortion cases involve both a constitutionally protected liberty 
and an important governmental interest in fetal life.539  Nevertheless, the Court 
can still clarify dimensions of a balancing analysis to eliminate some of the 
confusion in the lower courts. 
First, if a law severely burdens abortion access, as was the case in Whole 
Woman’s Health, courts should invalidate it, even if the government can show 
that it has some benefit.540  After all, Casey recognized that the government 
has an important interest throughout pregnancy in protecting fetal life.541  At-
taching too much importance to the benefit created by an abortion law could 
undermine the careful balance struck by Casey and encourage courts to uphold 
most (if not all abortion regulations).542 
If laws create a minimal burden but have little benefit, what approach 
should the Court take?  Here, voting-rights jurisprudence provides a helpful 
analogy.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applies a balancing 
test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze.543  To determine whether a law 
unduly burdens the right to vote,  
a court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh 
“the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff 
 
 538. C.f. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 532 (noting a similar 
power of invalidating a contract on the grounds of unconscionability for premarital agreements). 
 539. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 540. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016) (“The rule announced 
in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer . . . [and] consider whether any burden imposed on abortion access 
is ‘undue.’”). 
 541. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 542. Id. at 876 (“The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the 
conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.  Not all burdens on the right to decide 
whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.”). 
 543. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 [Vol. 47: 665, 2020] Men’s Reproductive Rights 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
727 
seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into 
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary 
to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”544   
The Court has insisted that even the most modest burdens require proof that 
the government addresses a real problem.545  “However slight that burden may 
appear,” the Court recently explained, “it must be justified by relevant and 
legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”546  If 
a law impacts a constitutionally protected liberty, the government should 
show that it advances some concrete goal.547  Both in the context of voting and 
abortion, the Court must strike a balance between important governmental 
concerns and constitutionally significant liberties.  To do so, the state should 
show that a law delivers some benefit. 
The Court should also clarify that Casey’s balancing requires considera-
tion of the impact of an entire statutory scheme on a woman’s access to abor-
tion rather than the effect of an isolated regulation.548  Casey and Whole 
Woman’s Health clarify that the real-world effect of abortion regulations mat-
ters, and women’s ability to access abortion will depend on all the laws that a 
state implements.549  Taking an entire statutory scheme into account may also 
help to illuminate the purpose of a law, providing evidence of where a law fits 
into a broader legislative agenda. 
What about the definition of the large-fraction test?  The Court should 
establish that the undue-burden standard does not require the kind of numeri-
cal precision demanded by the Eighth Circuit in Jegley.550  Again, consider a 
comparison to voting rights.551  In Anderson, the Court addressed an Ohio law 
that required presidential candidates to meet a March filing deadline for those 
seeking to appear on the ballot in November.552  Those challenging the law 
 
 544. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 545. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008). 
 546. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)). 
 547. Id. 
 548. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–17 (2016); see Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 549. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
 550. Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. V. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 551. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (challenging an early filing dead-
line for Presidential candidates). 
 552. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782–83. 
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argued that it would unduly burden the right of independent-minded voters 
who would more likely favor a candidate emerging later in a race, perhaps in 
response to a specific issue or event.553  The Court found that the early filing 
deadline unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote without specifying a 
number of independent-minded voters who would be impacted by the re-
striction.554  Indeed, to the extent that the Court described the size of the af-
fected population, Anderson expressed particular concern about laws that 
harmed a small but well-defined group with “a particular viewpoint, associa-
tional preference, or economic status.”555  At times, parties in voting rights 
cases have put a number on the burden created by a law,556 but the Justices 
have never imposed such a requirement. 
Nor should the Court require a specific number in the abortion context.  
Just as in voting-rights case, many abortion regulations will often impact a 
specific, if sometimes small, group, such as domestic violence victims, poorer 
women, or those living in relatively isolated areas.557  Before a law goes into 
effect, it may be impossible to identify a specific number of affected women.  
And even after a law is implemented, those challenging an abortion regulation 
may have insurmountable obstacles in proving that those who have lost access 
to abortion can trace their problem to a law rather than to other issues, such as 
the market for abortion care or personal financial issues.  As Whole Woman’s 
Health suggested, a law that eliminates abortion access for some women cre-
ates constitutional problems even if many in a state would be unaffected. 
Although the nature of men’s reproductive rights remains unclear, the 
compromise struck in the late 1980s cast a long shadow on the law affecting 
both ART and abortion.  The Court should more carefully consider whether 
to apply a balancing approach when dealing with reproductive rights and 
should more carefully tailor any such test it applies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In legal history and constitutional law, reproductive rights have become 
synonymous with women.  Largely missing has been the history of the law 
 
 553. See id. at 790. 
 554. Id. at 792–94. 
 555. Id. at 793. 
 556. See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992). 
 557. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793; supra Section IV.A–B. 
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governing reproductive rights for men.  In some way, this gap makes sense: 
the Court has generally identified gender-neutral reproductive rights (such as 
those involving contraception or sterilization) or rejected the claims of men 
when they conflict with women. 
But recovering the history of men’s reproductive rights illuminates how 
the law governing both ART and abortion took its current shape.  Abortion 
foes seeking reproductive rights for men urged the Court to look at the parties’ 
individual circumstances in determining who should have the final say about 
procreation.  Abortion-rights supporters generally responded that gestation 
alone should break any tie between men and women in abortion cases.  The 
Court settled on a compromise between the two: treating gestation as dispos-
itive in abortion cases but otherwise making individual circumstances para-
mount. 
By focusing so much on gestation, we have lost sight of the distinctions 
between ART and abortion law—and of other considerations that should mat-
ter in defining a person’s reproductive rights.  When gestation cannot deter-
mine the outcome of reproductive disputes, we have more reason to worry 
about individualized balancing approaches than we might have expected.  Too 
often, courts applying both rules risk turning reproductive decision-making 
into a meritocracy, awarding rights to those who convince a judge that their 
view of childbearing and child-rearing is the most deserving.  As the history 
of debates about men and reproduction suggests, we deserve better. 
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